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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The goal of this study is to identify lessons learned for successfully developing and
implementing high-speed rail (HSR) in the United States. Few broad statements can be
made about high-speed ground transportation (HSGT) in the United States, but two points
are clear:
1. With the exception of the Northeast Corridor, there has been relatively little forward
movement if one looks at the number of years spent on many of these projects.
2. The federal government has played and continues to play a minimal role in HSGT,
generally restricting its efforts to funding pilot studies and technological research.
Given the early stages of these projects, “success” cannot be based on implementation, but is
defined in terms of whether a given HSR project is still actively pursuing development and/
or funding.
This study proceeded in two phases. Phase 1 was a literature review following two parallel
tracks: an assessment of federal and, where warranted, state legislation to determine what
was intended in terms of objectives and criteria identified in the legislation; and a broader
literature review that briefly assessed all HSR efforts in the United States since 1980 to
determine their history and current status. The result was an interim report, written by
Allison C. de Cerreño. Recommendations were made after Phase 1 to examine in more
depth three case studies: California, Florida, and the Pacific Northwest. Phase 2 consisted of
additional literature review and interviews with key individuals related to those three case
studies. This final report includes the results of both Phase 1 and Phase 2.
Allison C. de Cerreño researched and wrote the Florida case study, along with the Executive
Summary, the Introduction, the Synopsis of High-Speed Rail in the United States, and the
concluding section of the report. Daniel Evans researched and wrote the two case studies on
California and the Pacific Northwest. Howard Permut provided overall guidance on the
structuring of the case studies and development of lessons learned, helped formulate the
critical questions to address, and identified both the key players in the cases and the types of
information that should be included.
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METHODOLOGY
The first step was to identify as many cases of HSGT efforts in the country since 1980 as
possible. An extensive review revealed 19 cases. The cases offer a complex array of examples
with differences in a number of areas, including, but not limited to, the type of HSGT
being pursued; whether the project exists entirely in one state or spans several; the way
funding is being sought, both in terms of partnerships and the actual funding mechanisms;
whether the public is involved through voting and/or legislation; and the role of freight rail.
In many cases, early feasibility studies and environmental impact studies have been or are
being developed, but often on only a portion of a project, leading to a document trail that
often has to be pieced together.
The 19 projects were differentiated according to the type of system proposed:
• Incremental high-speed rail, which generally uses existing technologies and rights-ofway, but makes improvements to allow for speeds up to 150 miles per hour (mph)
(although in the United States, most projects aim for 110 mph) using either electrified
or nonelectrified systems
• New high-speed rail, which requires new rights-of-way and imported technologies
currently used in Asia or Europe, that typically would allow for speeds of just over
200 mph
• Magnetic levitation (Maglev) which, by doing away with steel-wheel-on-steel-rail,
would allow speeds in excess of 300 mph
Because Maglev uses a completely different technology and different sources of federal
funding, the lessons learned from those examples might not be helpful for other HSR
efforts. Given the scope of and resources for this study, Maglev projects were excluded from
the remainder of the study. The final fifteen projects—three new HSR and twelve
incremental HSR—were briefly assessed in terms of their history and current status.
California, Florida, and the Pacific Northwest were chosen for Phase 2.

FINDINGS, LESSONS, AND THEMES FOR CONSIDERATION
Several specific findings and lessons were learned from each of the three case studies. The
following broad themes for consideration were apparent.
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Leadership by the Federal Government

First and foremost is the need for leadership by the federal government, both in vision and
funding—and both have been lacking for some time. Amtrak has attempted to fill this void
to a degree but has been hampered by politics and funding issues.
Funding for both passenger rail and freight rail has long been neglected relative to other
transportation modes. This is partly because of the common acceptance of the myth that
railroads can pay for themselves, even when this is rarely the case. High-speed rail initiatives
suffer from this same lack of willingness to provide public support. Florida, for example, is
mired in debates over how its HSR project can be funded in the absence of public monies.
In terms of the type of vision that might be provided at the federal level, at the least,
guidance and standards for successful models are needed. Without this, states will continue
to fill the void with a multitude of models—constitutional amendments and legislation as
in Florida and California, multistate compacts as in the Pacific Northwest, public-private
partnerships—without a sense of what is most likely to succeed.
More important, there is an overarching need for a national network strategy for rail—one
that combines passenger, freight, and high-speed rail—plus a vision for how rail connects to
and interrelates with the other transportation modes around the country and how it all
might be funded. Otherwise, the nation will continue to miss critical opportunities for key
linkages and enhancing efficiency, not just for high-speed rail, but also for regular passenger
rail and freight transport.
Defining Cost

When cost-benefit analyses are developed for high-speed rail, the focus tends to be on the
bottom line: how much money will be put in and how much will be generated. By looking
at cost as bottom-line driven, we are unlikely to see high-speed rail implemented in the
United States because of the large capital investment needed to build such systems. A
broader tabulation that includes other costs borne by the transportation system and the
public as a whole under the “no-build” or “modal alternative” options often yields different
results.
Related to this is the need for clarity not only on the goals of the particular HSR project,
but also on who is reaping the benefits. In Florida, the central concern has been who should
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bear the risk for a project that is described as having a public benefit but looking for private
dollars. The private sector would like to see the state bear more risk, while the state would
like the private sector and the federal government to assume more risk. If there are public
benefits to an HSR project, then arguing for only private funding makes no sense, and such
projects are unlikely to succeed. If the public benefits are questionable, then private funding
is a better choice.
Institutionalized Support

The spark for building HSR often has begun with a particular person in a particular state. It
was Governor Bob Graham in Florida who visited Japan and believed Florida should have a
similar system. In California, several legislative leaders visited Europe and Japan and
returned with the same sentiments. While the initial vision is important for beginning an
effort, institutionalized support is critical to sustain the effort and successfully implement
HSR. Without institutional buy-in for a project, as well as the authority and responsibility
to identify, gather, and manage funding, and the responsibility for and capability of seeing a
project through, many HSR projects fail as soon as the key supporter or visionary leaves.
Indeed, this frustration led Florida voters to approve the constitutional amendment
requiring the building of HSR. As Florida demonstrates, a constitutional amendment or
legislative acts alone cannot replace the need for institutionalized support because the
former still can be challenged by successive governments or other stakeholders.
In the Pacific Northwest—the one multistate case in the study—there is some institutional
support in the state of Washington, but that is missing in Oregon and British Columbia,
perhaps demonstrating the need for a federal leadership role to help bridge such gaps.
Technologies and Approaches

Whether to develop a new HSR or an incremental HSR system depends greatly on what one
hopes to accomplish and the context within which one is working. For example, if the goal
is to increase the number of commuters using rail instead of automobile to minimize
highway congestion, the key is to increase frequency and reliability of service, reduce travel
times, and make the system more accessible. Such goals may be better met with an
incremental approach that invests in station and equipment improvements, fixing curves
and improving tracks, and enhancing signals, rather than new HSR. If the goal is to relieve
air congestion between urban areas to free up space for more long-distance flights, a new
HSR system linking key urban areas might be the better approach. However, such
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discussions do not always occur; often the decision to pursue one approach or another is
based more on political factors than on a clear assessment and explanation of what the
specific goals are and how best to meet them.
Opportunities

Opportunities for both incremental and new HSR exist in the United States and have for
many years, particularly along those corridors federally designated as HSR corridors. A
1997 Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) study on HSGT concluded that HSGT could
develop appreciable ridership. The key is to get at least one project fully implemented in a
way that is clearly HSR (as opposed to those that are capable of high speeds but only run at
such speeds for small distances). Once a project is in revenue service, many of the concerns
expressed by critics, including ridership projections and whether HSR can work in a
country where cars and air transport are dominant, can be addressed.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1960s, high-speed ground transportation (HSGT) has held the promise of fast,
convenient, and environmentally sound travel for distances between 40 and 600 miles.1
Japan was the first to deploy HSGT in 1964 when the Shinkansen bullet train began service
between Tokyo and Osaka, with top speeds of 270 kilometers per hour (kph) (169 miles per
hour [mph]). This was followed in 1982 by France’s Train à Grande Vitesse (TGV), linking
Paris and Lyon at speeds of 300 kph (188 mph), and later by Germany’s Intercity Express
(ICE) that also operates at speeds up to 300 kph (188 mph). South Korea recently began
high-speed rail (HSR) service and Taiwan is expected to follow shortly, the former using
French technology and the latter using Japanese bullet train technology.2
The U.S. experience with HSGT has differed greatly from that in Asia and Europe.
Congress first authorized studies aimed at deploying HSGT with the High-Speed Ground
Transportation Act of 1965, but to date there are only two examples of such systems in the
United States—the Empire Corridor and Northeast Corridor—and whether these systems
are truly high speed is debatable. Despite numerous efforts by states and the federal
government, nearly all U.S. high-speed rail projects have failed to progress significantly, and
none has come close to matching the performance levels of Asian and European systems.
Unlike its European and Asian counterparts, which made high-speed intercity rail a
national priority once it became clear that railroads were either in or potentially headed for
decline, the U.S. government has been reluctant to develop such projects. The only intercity
rail effort moved forward by the federal government beyond pilot studies and technological
research has been Amtrak. Ironically, the creation of Amtrak led to a stalemate regarding
intercity passenger rail’s relationship with other transportation modes and with
government. Since its creation, Amtrak’s relationship with other modes has been
characterized by a division between passenger and freight rail and the isolation of the former
from earmarked tax returns and cooperative planning and management.3 Both of these
issues also plague HSR efforts, along with other political and financial difficulties.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND SOME DEFINITIONS
The goal of this study is to identify lessons learned for successfully developing and
implementing HSR in the United States. Phase 1 comprised a two-part literature review: an
assessment of federal and, where warranted, state legislation to determine what was
intended in terms of objectives and criteria identified in the legislation; and a broader
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review that briefly assessed all HSR efforts in the United States since 1980 to determine
their history and current status. Phase 2 comprised a deeper literature review and interviews
to explore in more detail three case studies: California, Florida, and the Pacific Northwest.
This report incorporates the findings from both phases of the study.
Given the early stages of these projects, this report defines success by whether a given HSR
project is still actively pursuing development or funding. Comparisons are not made with
European or Asian HSR models because most U.S. cases have different goals for speed,
accessibility, and frequency. In some cases, HSR has been defined in terms of top speeds (for
example, above 110 mph); in others, HSR definitions revolve around market penetration.
Thus, each case is judged by how well the project has met its stated goals.
Since 1980, there have been 19 efforts to develop and deploy some form of high-speed
ground transportation in the United States. These projects have taken different forms, both
in terms of business models—which range from entirely public led and financed, to
privately funded, to public-private partnership—and in the type of HSGT they have sought
to employ:
• Incremental high-speed rail (Accelerail), which generally uses existing technologies and
rights-of-way, but makes improvements to allow for speeds up to 150 mph (though in
the United States, most projects aim for 110 mph) using electrified or nonelectrified
systems.4
• New high-speed rail (HSR),5 which requires new rights-of-way and imported
technologies currently used in Asia or Europe that typically allow speeds greater than
200 mph.
• Magnetic levitation (Maglev), which, by doing away with steel-wheel-on-steel-rail,
allows speeds greater than 300 mph.
Some of these projects have been formally designated by the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) as federal HSR corridors or identified under the Federal Railroad
Administration’s Maglev program. Such identification opens the door for federal funding
that might not be available otherwise. Other projects have been pursued without federal
designation, although several (as in Nevada) are hoping to achieve this status. Complicating
the situation is the fact that in some cases, states or groups of states have been pursuing
HSGT systems that include all or part of federally designated corridors, but expand upon
them by adding additional linkages. Table 1 lists those projects identified, along with the
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type of HSGT being pursued and their status relative to federal designation or
identification.
While incremental and new HSR projects differ in several ways, both the basic technologies
and the markets they would serve are similar. Maglev is fundamentally different than HSR:
it uses a completely different technology; it offers competitive service at a broader set of
distances (40 to 600 miles versus 100 to 500 miles); and its federal funding sources are
different. Because of these differences and the scope of and resources for the current study,
the remainder of this report discusses incremental and new HSR options, but not Maglev.
Table 1 U.S. High-Speed Ground Transportation Projects as of May 2004
Project/Corridor

Federally
Designated

Date of Initial
Designation

HSGT Type Being
Pursued

Atlanta–Chattanooga

No

--

Maglev

Baltimore, MD–
Washington, D.C.

Maglev Deployment
Program

1/18/01

Maglev

California Corridor

Yes

10/19/92

New HSR

Chicago Hub
Network
Midwest Regional
Rail Initiative

Yes

10/15/92

Incremental HSR

No, but includes
above

--

Empire Corridor

Yes

10/10/98

Incremental HSR

Florida Corridor

Yes

10/16/92

New HSR

Gulf Coast Corridor

Yes

11/18/98

Incremental HSR

Keystone Corridor

Yes

10/10/98

Incremental HSR

Nevada–Southern
California

No

--

Maglev

Northeast Corridor

No

--

Incremental HSR

Northern New
England Corridor

Yes

10/11/00

Incremental HSR

Ohio & Lake Erie
Regional Rail
Network

No, parts in Chicago
Hub

--

Incremental HSR
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Table 1 U.S. High-Speed Ground Transportation Projects as of May 2004 (Continued)
Project/Corridor

Federally
Designated

Date of Initial
Designation

HSGT Type Being
Pursued

Pacific Northwest
Corridor

Yes

10/20/92

Incremental HSR

Pittsburgh

Maglev Deployment
Program

1/18/01

Maglev

South Central
Corridor

Yes

10/11/00

Incremental HSR

Southeast Corridor
Southeastern HighSpeed Rail

Yes
No, but includes
above

10/20/92
--

Incremental HSR

Texas Triangle

No, part in South
Central Corridor

--

New HSR

OUTLINE OF THE REPORT
The following section provides a synopsis of HSR efforts in the United States since the
1980s. It begins with a review and assessment of federal legislation and the goals for HSGT
initially set forth by the U.S. DOT to provide the context within which to examine the
various projects. A brief summary of each project in the past 20 to 25 years is provided to
round out the three case studies.
High-Speed Rail Case Studies, on page 27, explores the California, Florida, and Pacific
Northwest case studies in greater detail. The history of each case is discussed along with an
assessment of why it has or has not progressed. The three cases offer an interesting mix:
California is a new HSR project; Florida has two parallel plans, one new HSR and one
incremental; the Pacific Northwest focuses on incremental HSR. California and Florida
both focus on corridors within their states that could eventually be linked to corridors
beyond their borders; the Pacific Northwest case involves more than one state, adding to
some of the complexities. In terms of business models, California is relying on public
funding for its project, Florida has experimented with several public-private partnership
models, and the Pacific Northwest is partnering with Amtrak. The three cases offer some
interesting counterpoints to each other and some broad lessons and themes for
consideration.
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The report concludes with a synthesis and comparison of the lessons provided by the case
studies as well as information gleaned from other projects around the country.
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A SYNOPSIS OF HIGH-SPEED RAIL IN THE UNITED STATES
Section 1010 of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA)
called for the selection and designation of five high-speed rail corridors around the United
States. In October 1992, U.S. Secretary of Transportation Andrew Card, Jr., announced the
designations of the following high-speed rail corridors: Midwest (renamed the Chicago
Hub), Florida, California, Southeast, and the Pacific Northwest. Seven years later, Section
1103(c) of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) authorized six
additional corridor designations, although to date only five additional designations have
been made: Gulf Coast, Keystone, Empire State, South Central, and Northern New
England.

HISTORY AND STATUS OF U.S. HSR PROJECTS SINCE 1980
The case studies in the following section provide detailed information on California,
Florida, and the Pacific Northwest, but it is instructive to briefly review the status of the
other HSR projects in the United States. Together, they provide a sense of the difficulties
involved with implementing HSR. The following pages provide brief descriptions and the
status of each federally designated corridor as well as several corridors that are not federally
designated. Where federally designated and not-federally designated systems overlap, they
are discussed together if warranted.6
At different times, the U.S. DOT has defined HSGT both in terms of absolute speeds
(anything over 90 mph) and in terms of markets and performance-based measurements,
which look to total trip time savings and natural groupings of metropolitan areas.7 In most
discussions, however, it tends toward the speed-based definition. For most HSR efforts in
the United States, the goal has not been to replicate European or Asian HSR systems but to
improve on what already exists.
Chicago Hub Network and the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (2 projects/1 inclusive
of the other)

In 1990, Illinois, Minnesota, and Wisconsin signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) aimed at evaluating the potential for a high-speed rail corridor linking Chicago,
Milwaukee, and Minneapolis-St. Paul. One year later, TMS/Benesch High-Speed Rail
Consultants presented their report, Tri-State High-Speed Rail Study: Chicago–Milwaukee–Twin
Cities Corridor, to the Departments of Transportation of the three states. The purpose of the
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report was “to investigate the economic and financial potential for constructing and
operating a high-speed rail system in one of two corridors…between Chicago and
Minneapolis-St. Paul.”8 The corridors examined were a southern corridor linking Chicago,
Milwaukee, and the Twin Cities via Madison, and a northern corridor linking the same
cities via Green Bay. The study concluded that the southern corridor appeared “very
promising in terms of ridership, revenues, financial, and economic benefits.”9 The report
recommended using existing rights-of-way and targeting 125-mph service.
Formally designated a federal high-speed rail corridor on October 15, 1992, the Chicago
Hub (formerly named the Midwest High-Speed Rail Corridor) initially included links
between Chicago and Detroit, Chicago and St. Louis, and Chicago and Milwaukee.
Additional linkages later were added, for a total of eight linkages covering 2,313 miles. The
network is shown in Figure 1 and details are provided in Table 2.

Figure 1 Chicago Hub Network
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Table 2 Chicago Hub Links
City Linkages – Federally Designated

Distance
(miles)

Goal
(mph)

Date
Designated

Chicago, IL – Detroit, MI

279

110

10/15/92

Chicago – St. Louis, MO

282

110

10/15/92

Chicago – Milwaukee, WI
– extension to Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN

445

110

10/15/92
12/11/98

Chicago – Indianapolis, IN – Cincinnati, OH

319

110

1/28/99

Chicago – Toledo, OH – Cleveland, OH

341

110

10/11/00

Cleveland – Columbus, OH – Cincinnati (3C)

254

110

10/11/00

Indianapolis – Louisville, KY

111

79

10/11/00

St. Louis – Kansas City, MO

282

90

1/19/01

U.S. DOT, Federal Railroad Administration, “Chicago Hub Network,”www.fra.dot.gov/Content3.asp?P=648 and
“Corridor Chronology,” www.fra.dot.gov/Content3.asp?P=1272 (accessed 18 February, 2004).

By 1994, Illinois planners had completed a study of 125-mph service for the Chicago–St.
Louis spoke, and the second phase of a study focused on the Chicago–Milwaukee spoke
recommended incremental nonelectric high-speed rail at 125 mph.10
In April 1997, Illinois entered into a cooperative agreement (DTFRDV-96-H-60006) with
the U.S. DOT to perform a Tier I environmental impact study (EIS) of the Chicago–St.
Louis spoke of the Chicago Hub Network. The total cost for the EIS was $4.469 million
over seven years. FRA contributed $2.8 million ($2.5 million of which was provided in the
first fiscal year of the study). This was matched with state funds totaling $1.66 million
($1.5 million from general revenues and the remainder from state planning funds, of which
80 percent is derived from the Federal Highway Administration.).11 The final EIS, released
in January 2003, proposed that HSR passenger service between Chicago and St. Louis be
implemented with a maximum operating speed of 110 mph on the section south of Dwight
and ongoing speeds of 79 mph north of Dwight. Three different alignments were identified
for the north-of-Dwight portion of the line, but a formal recommendation was not made
because of funding constraints.12
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Work has begun along the Chicago–St. Louis spoke of the Hub Network. In 1999, Illinois
voters approved $70 million for HSR infrastructure and grade-crossing improvements along
the Chicago–St. Louis spoke.13 Several improvements have been made to upgrade the tracks
to allow for 110 mph speeds on the south of the Dwight–Springfield portion of the spoke. A
Positive Train Control system14 demonstration is underway along that same spoke. The
FRA reports grants totaling $28 million to Illinois through fiscal year 2002 under FRA’s
Next Generation High-Speed Rail Program.15
Running parallel to the EIS efforts, nine Midwestern states (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin) joined to form the
Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI) in 1996. The goal was to develop an
implementation plan for a more extensive HSR centered around the Chicago Hub. Totaling
3,000 miles, the MWRRI includes the federally designated corridors in the Chicago Hub
Network, and adds additional passenger rail links at various speeds above and below 110
mph, as well as several feeder bus service links.
Working with Amtrak and the FRA, the MWRRI developed a report assessing the hub
approach to the region. Their report, Midwest Regional Rail System: A Transportation Network
for the 21st Century, issued in February 2000, concluded that completing the system
envisioned would require a decade and approximately $4 billion in infrastructure upgrades
and new equipment.16 The proposed Midwest regional rail system includes the Chicago
Hub Network as designated by the FRA, but expands upon it with a number of additional
links. The following city links are not federally designated:
• Milwaukee, WI–Green Bay, WI
• Chicago, IL–Quincy, IL
• Chicago, IL–Iowa City, IA–Des Moines, IA–Omaha, NE
• Chicago, IL–Carbondale, MO
• Kalamazoo, MI–Grand Rapids, MI–Holland, MI
• Kalamazoo, MI–Lansing, MI–Port Huron, MI
• Detroit, MI–Pontiac, MI
In 1998, the Midwestern Legislative Conference formed a High-Speed Rail Task Force. Out
of that task force, the Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission (MIPRC) was formed
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by a compact in 2000. The MIPRC works with the MWRRI, providing an advocacy arm
for HSR in the region.
In 2002, Amtrak and the states of Illinois and Wisconsin began reviewing proposals for
110-mph tilting HSR trains. Lack of federal funding was cited as the reason for the delay in
concluding procurement.17 According to Amtrak, the state of Michigan, Amtrak, and the
FRA have developed a state-of-the-art incremental train control system that permits
passenger train operations on the existing rights-of-way at speeds up to 110 mph. The first
phase of the system (up to 90 mph on 45 miles of track along the Chicago–Detroit spoke)
was implemented in January 2002. Work began to extend the system an additional
20 miles and to seek approval for operations at speeds in excess of 90 mph.18 Speeds have
been increased to 110 mph on this section in southwest Michigan.19
With respect to the other spokes of the hub, Indiana has completed a series of high-speed
rail public outreach meetings to define the state’s interest and participation in the MWRRI.
Indiana is working with Amtrak, the states of Illinois and Michigan, and freight railroads
on the South of the Lake Corridor Study to identify the best way to route passenger trains
through southern Chicago and northwest Indiana.20 Minnesota is pursuing a $10 million
capital budget request for preliminary engineering and environmental documentation for
the Minnesota portion of the Chicago–Minneapolis–St. Paul Corridor.
With more than $10 million21 from the states and the FRA invested in planning, the
Chicago Hub Network provides a success story of an incremental HSR project—or series of
projects, in this case—by this study’s definition of success. Some work has occurred and the
project is being actively pursued, both substantively and financially. Finding construction
funding is a key obstacle, but the Chicago Hub Network gives a complex picture of
federally designated and non-federally designated corridors. There also is a strong rail
component, as the state of Illinois pursues its Chicago Regional Environmental and
Transportation Efficiency Program (CREATE) in tandem with HSR efforts. Union Pacific,
which owns several of the key lines, is willing to cooperate to implement HSR in the region.
Empire Corridor

Designated in December 1998 as a federal HSR corridor, the Empire Corridor connects
New York City with Albany and Buffalo, for a total of 439 miles running through New
York State (Figure 2). New York State has run 110-mph passenger rail service on portions of
the Albany–New York City stretch of the Empire Corridor route since the 1970s.22 (The
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improvements along the line that allowed higher speeds were largely financed through the
1974 Rail Bond Act.) Speeds along the rest of the corridor are limited to 90 mph at most, in
part because of the shared right-of-way with the Metropolitan Transportation Authority
south of Poughkeepsie and with CSX Corporation railroad for most of the corridor between
Poughkeepsie and Buffalo.

Figure 2 Empire Corridor, and Keystone, Northeast, and Northern New England
Corridors

In September 1998, an MOU was signed by the New York State DOT and Amtrak that
committed the former to rebuilding several old Turboliners and the latter to track
improvements that would allow speeds of up to 125 mph on the section between New York
City and Schenectady. The estimated cost of the plan was $185 million, but travel times
were expected to be reduced significantly throughout the corridor. In January 2004,
Amtrak announced its intention to withdraw, citing delays and increased costs.23 In the
meantime, three Turboliners were delivered to Amtrak; two were placed in regular service
until later in 2004, when they were taken out of service as a result of high fuel consumption
and excessive costs.
One of the few corridors in the country where speeds of 110 mph are being achieved in
places, the Empire Corridor is an interesting case and is considered by some to be a success
story for incremental HSR. However, with the recent Amtrak announcement and the
likelihood that the goal of 125 mph will not be reached soon, nor on a good portion of the
corridor, it is unclear whether to consider this a success or failure.
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Gulf Coast Corridor

Formally designated as a federal HSR corridor in November 1998, with extensions
approved in October 2000, the Gulf Coast Corridor (Figure 3) covers 1,022 miles and
connects cities in Texas (Houston), Louisiana (New Orleans), Alabama (Mobile and
Birmingham), Mississippi (Meridian), and Georgia (Atlanta).24 The goal is to run HSR at
speeds of 110 mph. Louisiana received a $1 million earmark in Fiscal Year 1999 and
$1.85 million was provided under TEA-21 for elimination of at-grade crossings. The lead
for planning the corridor is the Southern Rapid Rail Transportation Commission (SRRTC),
which includes representatives from Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.

Figure 3 Gulf Coast Corridor

In September 2002, the SRRTC was awarded a cooperative agreement by the FRA for Phase
I of the Deep South HSR Corridor Study. In Phase I, it will identify institutional issues,
make service projections, gather information, and develop a rail operations plan. A specific
strategy for implementation will form the basis for Phase II.
Because funding for the study was scheduled to last through September 2004, it is likely
that the study is not yet completed. According to the FRA, there are physical constraints
along the CSX lines between New Orleans and Mobile that might prevent HSR for much of
this distance.
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Keystone Corridor

The Keystone Corridor was designated as a federal HSR corridor in December 1998 (see
Figure 2). Now consisting of 349 miles, the initial designation linked Philadelphia and
Harrisburg, with an extension to Pittsburgh approved by the U.S. DOT in 2000. Amtrak
owns the roughly 100 miles of track between Philadelphia and Harrisburg where current
efforts are focused.
In November 1999, Amtrak and the State of Pennsylvania entered into an MOU and
announced a joint $140 million infrastructure and equipment upgrade program on the
Philadelphia–Harrisburg segment of the line to reduce trip times to 90 minutes by 2004,
enhance stations, and improve reliability.25 In October 2003, Governor Rendell announced
another $3 million for passenger rail service between Harrisburg and Philadelphia as part of
a $125 million capital budget aimed at improving public transportation.26 Work continues
on the line, although more slowly than anticipated. Roughly $20 million has been
expended, with an anticipated $30 million in total by the end of 2004.27 Recent discussions
with Amtrak have resulted in a verbal agreement that the remaining funding will be
redeployed in light of a reassessment of needs on this segment of the corridor. However, the
project is expected to continue, with a completion date of December 2006.
Another example of an incremental HSR project within one state, efforts continue on this
line, although it appears to have some difficulties similar to the Empire Corridor in terms of
Amtrak’s role.
Northeast Corridor

Although not formally designated as a federal corridor, the Northeast Corridor (see Figure
2) is one of the few U.S. success stories in HSR; however, its key successes in terms of speed
came by the early 1970s and there has been little improvement since. As Perl notes,
however, while HSR in the Northeast Corridor did not keep pace with the speed and
reliability of European and Asian efforts, it did keep pace with respect to commercial
performance by covering costs and generating an operating profit.28
In 1967, following the High-Speed Ground Transportation Act two years prior, the Office
of HSGT at the U.S. DOT committed $6.7 million to support Pennsylvania Railroad’s
acquisition of new passenger cars that could attain speeds up to 160 mph.29 The goal was to
shorten the trip between New York City and Washington, D.C., to less than three hours.
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What made the Northeast Corridor so marketable was a combination of economic and
geographic circumstances. Because the Northeast Corridor lacked the space to add the
highway and air capacity needed to match growing travel demands, it was a good candidate
for enhancing existing infrastructure. The corridor had a well-developed and modern rail
infrastructure when the decision was made, and Pennsylvania Railroad, which owned and
operated the line between New York City and Washington, D.C., was willing to work with
the government on the initiative.30
This was a true private-public enterprise: Private partners put approximately $860 million
into the project, with only about $13 million from government sources. The key
manufacturing companies—GE, Westinghouse, and the Budd Company—were all U.S.
based. The partners had the Metroliner HSR system up and running within four years.
However, because the long-term goal of upgrading the tracks to accommodate the higher
speeds was not yet met, the trains could only run at speeds as high as 120 mph.
The partnership ended when Penn Central filed for bankruptcy in 1970, with other
railroads following soon after. Amtrak took over operation of the Metroliner between New
York City and Washington, D.C., between 1978 and 1999; FRA invested about
$3.7 billion in rehabilitating and upgrading the corridor. In 1992, Amtrak initiated the
Acela HSR program and has invested $1.8 billion to date in a system that could run at
speeds of 150 mph. Work focused especially on the New York City–Boston segment of the
corridor, rebuilding infrastructure and fully electrifying the line to Boston from New
Haven, Connecticut.31
Revenue service of the Acela began in December 2000 and trains now operate between 110
and 150 mph on parts of the corridor. However, in more than 30 years, except for the
introduction of the Acela, little has changed on the southern section of the corridor in terms
of speed and number of trains making the trip on a daily basis, even as the airlines have
modified their schedules to accommodate more passengers and more trips. This corridor is
considered a success because the system has been operating at HSR speeds for several
decades, although the ultimate goal has not yet been achieved on much of the line.
Northern New England Corridor

One of the newest of the federally designated corridors, the Northern New England
Corridor was formally designated in October 2000 (see Figure 2). Shaped like a lopsided V,
the 489-mile corridor connects Boston with Portland and Auburn, Maine, on one side and
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connects Boston with Montreal, Canada, on the other. Current speeds on the section from
Boston to Portland (which began being serviced by Amtrak in December 2001) average
only 59 mph. In January 2002, a meeting was held in Nashua, New Hampshire, to begin a
Boston–Montreal high-speed rail feasibility study, jointly funded by the FRA and the
Departments of Transportation of Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire. The
study’s first phase, which focuses on ridership forecasts, infrastructure, public participation,
and institutional issues, was scheduled for completion in September 2002, but has not yet
been released.
Ohio and Lake Erie Regional Rail Network

In 1975, the Ohio Rail Transportation Authority (ORTA) was created and charged with
creating a plan for an intrastate passenger rail system that could be brought to the voters for
support, and with promoting a sound and efficient freight rail system. In 1979, ORTA
recommended incremental HSR as the most viable option because it could be implemented
at speeds up to 150 mph in a relatively short time. Within a few years, however, they had
shifted to advocating a new HSR system, thinking that construction of such a system would
also generate jobs in a state experiencing an economic downturn. In 1982, the ORTA
proposal was defeated at the polls.
ORTA’s responsibilities were shifted to the Ohio Department of Transportation’s (ODOT)
Rail Division in 1983, and an Ohio High-Speed Rail Authority was created in 1985 to
assist in developing a statewide rail plan, including HSR. The latter was terminated in
1989. Five years later, the Ohio Rail Development Commission (ORDC) was established by
the legislature as part of ODOT. Consistent with earlier Ohio policy on rail, the ORDC was
charged with addressing all rail issues, including passenger and freight.
In 1997, the ORDC began another serious look at HSR. They actively pursued federal
designation of the 3-Cs (Cleveland–Columbus–Cincinnati) Corridor as part of the Chicago
Hub Network and actively participated in the Midwest Regional Rail System. The ORDC
and ODOT also identified several other corridors for further investigation and continue to
seek federal HSR designation.
In 2001, the ORDC requested funds from the state for a study of the Detroit–Pittsburgh
section of what they are calling the Cleveland Hub (see Figure 4 from the Ohio Rail
Development Commission Website, http://www.dot.state.oh.us/ohiorail/CleveHub%20
Map.htm). ODOT and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) approved funding,
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although at the time of this report it appears that study is not yet completed. ODOT has
also been working on a study with the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) on
the Detroit–Toledo line.

Figure 4 Ohio and Lake Erie Regional Rail: Cleveland Hub

The remainder of the corridors remain unassessed with respect to their feasibility for HSR.32
The following ORDC corridors are not federally designated:
• Toledo, OH–Detroit, MI
• Cleveland, OH–Pittsburgh, PA
• Cleveland, OH–Erie, NY–Buffalo, NY–Niagara Falls, NY–Toronto, Canada
• Toledo, OH–Columbus, OH
• Chicago, IL–Ft. Wayne, IN–Lima, OH–Columbus, OH
• Columbus, OH–Pittsburgh, PA
South Central Corridor

The South Central Corridor was designated a federal corridor in October 2000. Shaped like
a Y, it connects San Antonio, Texas, to Tulsa, Oklahoma, via Austin, Dallas/Fort Worth and
Oklahoma City on one fork, and San Antonio to Little Rock, Arkansas, via Austin, Dallas/
Fort Worth, and Texarkana on the other. The entire system covers 994 miles. Nothing
appears to have moved forward in this corridor.
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Southeast Corridor and Southeastern High-Speed Rail (2 projects: 1 inclusive of the
other)

Designated as a federal corridor in October 1992, the initial Southeast Corridor linked
Washington, D.C., to Richmond, Virginia. In 1995, an extension was approved to
Hampton Roads, Virginia, with additional extensions approved in December 1998 and
October 2000 (Figure 5).

Figure 5 Southeast Corridor

The current corridor links Washington, D.C., with five states and the Gulf Coast Corridor
in the following segments:
• Washington, D.C.–Richmond, VA
• Richmond, VA–Hampton Roads, VA
• Richmond, VA–Raleigh, NC–Greensboro, NC–Charlotte, NC
• Raleigh, NC–Columbia, SC–Savannah, GA–Jacksonville, FL
• Atlanta, GA–Macon, GA
• Charlotte, NC–Atlanta, GA
Southeastern High-Speed Rail includes the federally designated corridor, but extends the
links to include the segment to Birmingham, Alabama, covered by the Gulf Coast federally
designated corridor and an additional segment to Chattanooga and Nashville, Tennessee.33
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A report issued in 1997 by the U.S. DOT identified the Southeast Corridor as the most
economically viable of all the proposed HSR projects.34 One year later, the Virginia
Department of Rail and Public Transport, North Carolina’s Department of Transportation,
the FRA, and the FHWA signed an MOU to jointly develop environmental documentation
related to implementing HSR on the portions of the corridor in Virginia and North
Carolina. A Tier I EIS followed in 1999, focused on the Washington, D.C.–Charlotte
segment of the corridor. The Tier I EIS was completed in 2002 and a Record of Decision on
the proposed route was issued by the FRA and FHWA, allowing the Tier II EIS to begin.
The proposed date of completion was 2004.
Texas Triangle

Linking the cities of Dallas and Houston, Dallas and San Antonio, and San Antonio and
Houston, the Texas Triangle is not a federally designated corridor, although parts of it are
included in the federally designated South Central Corridor. Efforts began in 1987 when the
Texas Legislature directed the Texas Turnpike Authority to study the feasibility of HSR in
the Texas Triangle. In 1989, a report was made to the legislature concluding that under
certain assumptions, HSR would be feasible. In May 1989, the Texas High-Speed Rail Act
created the 11-member Texas High-Speed Rail Authority (THSRA). It was charged with
determining if HSR was in the public interest and, if so, awarding a franchise to develop
and operate such a system. In 1990, requests for letters of intent and then a request for
proposals were issued, with proposals received the following year from the Texas HighSpeed Rail Joint Venture (later Texas FasTrac) and the Texas TGV Consortium. The latter
was awarded the franchise to build, operate, and maintain an HSR system in the triangle.
Initially, the Texas TGV Consortium expected a more streamlined process with fewer
constraints because there was to be no public funding for the project. It quickly became
clear that there were major hurdles to overcome. In the franchise agreement, Texas TGV
agreed to pay for THSRA’s ongoing operating budget and to obtain $170 million in equity
financing by the end of 1992. Because of new safety regulations under the FRA, a complete
EIS would need to be prepared, including public hearings, all at Texas TGV’s expense.35
The initial 1992 deadline was missed and extended for an additional year. The financing
deadline was missed again in 1993, and by 1994 the contract had been terminated. Part of
the difficulty in obtaining funding was directly related to Southwest Airlines’ aggressive
countercampaign, which launched several lawsuits during this period and allied with key
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partners to block congressional funding in an effort to stop what they saw as a competitor
for their customers.
Texas TGV’s investors lost about $40 million by the end of the process.36 More importantly,
according to Perl, “The Texas TGV’s failure was a delegitimizing event for the proponents
of market-led rail passenger renewal.”37 The Texas Triangle is a clear example of a failure, as
they are no longer actively pursuing funding or development.
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HIGH-SPEED RAIL CASE STUDIES
The following three case studies were selected for further review based on the potential for
some demonstrable lessons learned or themes for consideration that would be relevant to
other projects around the country. These three studies offer interesting counterpoints:
California is pressing for a new HSR system; the Pacific Northwest case focuses on
incremental HSR; and Florida has two plans—one for new HSR and one for an incremental
system. In Florida and California, voters are heavily involved and, in some ways, leading
HSR efforts, while the Pacific Northwest case is led primarily by state agencies. The Pacific
Northwest demonstrates the difficulties of multistate efforts, while California and Florida
are testaments to the fact that single-state efforts also often meet with difficulty. Finally,
while California to a large degree and the Pacific Northwest to a smaller degree have a
history of reliance on rail and public transit systems, Florida has for many years been focused
on the automobile and highways, adding to the difficulty of implementing HSR.

FLORIDA
Not clearly a success or a failure at this point, Florida’s intercity passenger rail plan is an
interesting case in dealing with high-speed rail. Florida’s experience with HSR dates back
more than 30 years, including several starts and stops and multiple plans and pieces of
legislation. The current project plan focuses on building a new HSR system along a 92-mile
stretch connecting Tampa and Orlando (Figure 6). A Draft Environmental Impact
Statement (DEIS) has been completed as part of the Project Development and
Environmental (PD&E) Process, preferred alignments have been identified, and the Florida
High-Speed Rail Authority (FHSRA) has executed a contract with Fluor-Bombardier to
provide professional services to complete the final EIS. A Record of Decision on the final
EIS by the U.S. Federal Railroad Administration is pending,
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Figure 6 Florida Corridor

All this activity is occurring against the backdrop of an intense and extremely divisive
political debate within a state that is historically dependent on the automobile, with little
commuter rail or transit, and an antitax culture. In 2000, a constitutional amendment,
conceived and spearheaded by Florida citizens, was approved by voters, requiring the state
to build a high-speed ground transportation system. Governor Jeb Bush (R, 1999–present),
who curtailed an earlier HSR project when he took office, helped lead an effort to stop the
current plans. Unable to get bills passed through the state House and Senate, he turned to
the voters to gain enough signatures to place a measure on the November 2004 ballot to
repeal the 2000 amendment. That amendment was repealed on November 2, 2004, with
63.7 percent of the vote in favor of repealing it.38 Before the repeal of the amendment was
definite, the Florida legislature cut all state funding for high-speed rail, citing the
likelihood of veto by Bush.39
The public debate in Florida focuses on cost and marketability. Those opposed to building
HSR in Florida argue that the costs are too high, the state is being asked to shoulder an
undue burden, and contributing funds for HSR will reduce monies needed for other
transportation programs, in particular, highway projects. Those pressing for HSR cite
growing population pressures and transportation capacity needs that require an intermodal
approach that links Florida’s urban areas. They also argue that funds have been set aside for
HSR within the Florida Department of Transportation, so an HSR project should not be a
drain on other transportation programs, and that costs would be far outweighed by the
economic benefits HSR would bring over the life of the project.

Mineta Transportation Institute

High-Speed Rail Case Studies

29

The Florida case also may provide lessons on other contextual issues. For example, while
projected cost is an important rallying point for both sides of the debate, there are two more
fundamental issues related to this that go beyond the immediate debate:
• the role of public investment in intercity passenger rail, and the unwillingness of
government to subsidize this transportation mode as it does others
• defining cost as purely monetary costs rather than a broader definition that includes
environmental costs, societal costs, energy costs, and so on.
Florida also provides insight about the effect of the type of project being pursued. The
current debate relates to new HSR, but some people prefer an incremental solution,
believing that would help prove HSR marketability without the financial risks of a new
system. Why new HSR was chosen over an incremental approach and how that decision has
affected the likelihood of a successful outcome is relevant for other projects. The role of the
state legislature and the importance of the constitutional amendment also will be examined
to see how they affected the likelihood of successfully implementing HSR in the state.
A History of HSR in Florida

The history of HSR in Florida covers three decades of multiple starts and stops, numerous
corridor studies and proposals, and millions of dollars in investments, yet still no HSR. In
1976, the Florida legislature mandated the Florida Transit Corridor Study to determine the
feasibility of HSR between Daytona Beach and St. Petersburg. The study concluded that, if
implemented in stages using existing highway corridors, HSR would be marketable in
Florida. The study proposed using existing rail corridors and the possibility of locating
HSR within limited access highway medians, an idea with which the Florida Department of
Transportation (FDOT) agreed.40
Six years later, Governor Bob Graham (D, 1979–1987) visited Japan and traveled on the
Shinkansen. He returned to Florida a strong supporter of HSR and authorized the creation of
the Florida High-Speed Rail Committee (FHSRC) as a first step toward creating such a
system in his state. In 1984, the committee released the Florida Future Advanced
Transportation Report, which concluded that Florida’s transportation infrastructure could not
accommodate future growth and that an advanced HSR system was necessary to
maintaining mobility in the state. The report recommended developing public-private
partnerships and using existing publicly owned rights-of-way (ROWs). During that same
year, Florida’s legislature enacted the Florida High-Speed Rail Transportation Commission
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Act, which created the seven-member Florida High-Speed Rail Commission (FHSRC) and
authorized it to grant a franchise to build a privately funded and operated high-speed rail
network serving Miami, Tampa, and Orlando.
In 1986, the HSR Commission released its own study by Barton Aschman Associates that
recommended proceeding with a 356-mile HSR system connecting Miami, Orlando, and
Tampa. Requests for proposals were issued; two were received in 1988, one from Florida
TGV, Inc., and one from Florida High-Speed Rail Corporation. The former proposed using
French TGV trains, which could run at speeds of 170 mph. The estimated cost of building
the system was $2.2 billion, with ridership projections of 5.9 million annually.41 The latter
proposed using Swedish-built ABBX2000 trains with tilt technologies that could run at
speeds of 150 mph. Estimated costs were $1.9 billion, with projected ridership at 3.7
million annually.42 Both proposals assumed some public spending and/or real estate
development rights, but when it was clear that there would be no support for public
funding, Florida TGV, Inc., withdrew. Florida High-Speed Rail Corporation submitted a
revised proposal in 1990 that proposed financing the project with a combination of tax
increment financing, benefit districts, impact fees, and a new gas tax. One year later,
Governor Lawton Chiles (D, 1991–1998) rejected the proposal, citing high costs.
Despite the lack of support in the governor’s office, the legislature enacted a new HighSpeed Rail Act in 1992, transferring the FHSRC’s responsibilities to FDOT. FDOT also was
charged with providing an updated rail system plan every other year that incorporated both
passenger and freight components. That same year, on October 16, the Miami–Orlando–
Tampa Corridor was federally designated as a high-speed rail corridor by the U.S.
Department of Transportation, allowing the possibility of federal funds for studies.
During the next two years, more corridor studies were conducted by FDOT to evaluate the
feasibility of a network of HSR corridors connecting major cities around the state. Based on
the findings of these studies, FDOT announced its commitment to fund HSR, setting aside
$70 million per year, plus a 4 percent inflation adjustment, for at least 30 years. The funds
would service infrastructure bonds using a portion of Florida’s gasoline tax that had been
earmarked for nonhighway expenditures.43 As Perl points out, “such a dowry, while small in
relation to the level of government support routinely extended to air or road infrastructure,
made Florida’s planned high-speed rail development far more attractive to private industry
than prospects in other states.”44 This was evidenced by the response to FDOT’s 1995
request for proposals. Five proposals were submitted, offering a range of public-private
options for the Miami–Tampa–Orlando corridor, including plans aimed at incremental
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improvements, new high-speed rail using bullet trains, and two proposals for Maglev
technologies. Cost estimates on the proposals ranged from a low of $740 million to a high of
$20 billion.45
The Florida Overland eXpress Project

After evaluating the proposals, FDOT selected the Florida Overland eXpress (FOX)
Consortium, comprising Fluor Daniel Corporation, Odebrecht-Campanhia Brasileira de
Projectos e Obras, Bombardier, GEC-Alsthom, Bear Stearns, Banque Nationale de Paris,
and several consulting groups. FOX proposed to build and operate a new grade-separated,
fully dedicated HSR serving the three cities at an estimated capital cost of $6.1 billion. The
rationale for a new HSR system instead of an incremental approach stemmed from the goals
laid out in the request for proposals (RFP) and the belief that if the critical goal were to
move people from point A to point B quickly and efficiently, a dedicated ROW was
necessary.46 FOX officials felt strongly that sharing tracks through an incremental approach
would never allow the speeds and frequency of service of a dedicated ROW.
Like the earlier proposal from Florida TGV, Inc., FOX planned to use French TGV
technology for its rolling stock. Although other technologies were available, the selection of
the TGV was aimed at minimizing risk, particularly in the eyes of the financial industry.
Because HSR did not exist in the United States, it was (and still is) considered a high-risk
venture; using a proven technology could at least mitigate risk on the technological side. In
revenue service since 1981, the TGV had demonstrated the fastest trip times, the most
reliability, and the best safety record of the potential technologies available.47 (It should be
noted that evolving FRA safety standards would have required changes to conventional
TGV technology for high-speed operation in the United States.)
Envisioned as a private-public partnership, franchise and precertification agreements were
executed in 1997, with the understanding that FDOT would provide $70 million per year
(escalated at 4 percent per year) for 30 to 40 years. Using a portion of Florida’s gasoline tax
revenues, a percentage of which had been earmarked for nonhighway-related expenditures,
these funds would be used to service infrastructure bonds. FOX would contribute
$349 million in equity funds over the construction period to capitalize FOX.48 Although a
significant amount of money, the $349 million only accounted for 4 percent of the total
projected costs, estimated at up to $9.3 billion total.49 (Private investment was set at
$349 million because of a state cap on the private equity share that demanded a high return
of investment, making it less expensive to use public funds.50) The remainder of the costs
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would be financed through debt financing and bonds, repaid by revenues and a portion of
the annual state contributions, although $2 billion in federal loans through the
Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) were also sought
(Figure 7).51
State-contributed
Equity - 3%

Federal Loans
22%
System
Infrastructure
Bonds - 36%

FOX-contributed
Equity - 4%
State
Infrastructure
Bonds - 23%

Train Equipment
Financing - 6%
Interest Earnings
and Balances 6%

Figure 7 Sources of Funding for the FOX Project

This last point has been a continuous source of contention because it is not just unclear, but
also unlikely, that federal support would be provided for HSR at the levels needed.
FDOT viewed the project as playing a key role in an integrated transportation system that
would link various modes and meet the travel needs of tourists and residents, while being
environmentally and fiscally responsible.52 Studies undertaken by Tim Lynch at Florida
State University’s Center for Economic Forecasting and Analysis and by Steven Polzin at the
University of South Florida’s Center for Urban Transportation Research, provided a detailed
description of the need for and projected impacts of the FOX HSR project.
Regarding the need for an HSR project, Lynch and Polzin noted that Florida’s population
grew by 91 percent between 1970 and 1990, and they projected an additional increase of
38 percent by 2010. Tourism was projected to increase by 82 percent during that same
period. Increased numbers of residents and tourists was expected to create a tremendous
increase in demand for highway capacity that would exceed the projected 18 percent
increase in highway lane miles through 2010.53 Thus, an alternate mode was necessary and
Lynch and Polzin went so far as defining HSR as “one of several pivotal transportation
investments needed....”54
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Lynch and Polzin noted several benefits of HSR connecting Miami, Tampa, and Orlando:
• 1.4 million fewer auto trips by 2010
• 60,000 fewer airport flights by 2010
• $1.667 billion (1997 dollars) per year of increased economic activity during the four
peak construction years
• 80 pounds fewer pollutants per person for any traveler who shifted mode to HSR by
2010
• Reduced energy consumption equivalent to 4.7 gallons of gasoline per person who
shifted mode 55
Bolstered by these findings and FDOT’s support, FOX began its preliminary engineering
and environmental work in 1998. Opponents quickly sprang up, questioning everything
from costs and environmental issues to the use of imported technology. A grassroots
campaign called Derail the Bullet Train actively campaigned against FOX, suggesting that
the new HSR project would lead to “an ineffective use of public money.” State Senator Ron
Klein (D-District 30, Palm Beach), founder of Derail the Bullet Train, said that public
transportation was and continues to be underdeveloped in Florida and, given the costs
involved, he and many others would rather see such funds used toward regional forms of
public transportation than intercity HSR.56
Others began poking holes in FOX’s ridership projections and revenue estimates, often
arguing that the United States was unlikely to follow European and Asian experiences with
HSR. Although FOX’s ridership study was said to have included “a more intense review and
detailed ridership study than anywhere else in the world”57 at that time, many were
skeptical because there was no HSR in the United States. For example, FOX assumed that
some airlines would agree to code-share agreements so travelers could easily transfer from
planes flying into the cities onto HSR, as was done in Europe. However, an independent
report in 1998 by Wilbur Smith Associates, commissioned by the Florida Transportation
Commission, which oversees FDOT, concluded that the assumption was unverified in the
United States. (The fact that U.S. airlines have not been quick to support HSR, and in
several cases—most notably Texas—have openly opposed it, suggests that the assumption
should be questioned.) FOX also assumed that some air passengers would choose HSR over
air because of lower fares. However, the report stated that in many cases, air fares were
already much lower than FOX projections. (In a letter from C.C. Dockery to Senator Toni
Jenning, Dockery refutes these claims, demonstrating that the FOX fares were significantly
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lower than the air fares at the time.58) It also was assumed that more than 50 percent of the
riders would be automobile drivers who would shift mode, something that Wilbur Smith
Associates again argued was unproven in the United States, and particularly in a state like
Florida, which relies extensively on the automobile. Many people thought that FOX’s
ridership and revenue projections were too optimistic in an environment in which HSR was
unproven.59
Shortly thereafter, U.S. House Budget Committee Chair John Kasich (R-Ohio) asked the
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) to review FOX’s proposal. The GAO’s 1999 report
noted that because it was in the early phases of development, the FOX project faced “several
uncertainties regarding its cost, ridership, and schedule…. It will be at least 2 more years
before sufficient information is available to comprehensively assess the project.”60 The GAO
warned that investing in FOX could constrain other Transportation Infrastructure Finance
and Innovation Act (TIFIA) allocations. The report stated that “the FOX project could
require a substantial portion of TIFIA’s total 5-year funding.” It further noted that at least
31 projects nationwide would be eligible for TIFIA funds and that “limited TIFIA funds
would be available for these projects if the Department decides to provide FOX with a $2
billion loan.”61
The report had a strong chilling effect, especially among potential investors, and lent
further credence to concerns over the ability to secure federal funding for the project. Upon
taking office in January 1999, Governor Bush terminated funding (as Governor Chiles had
eight years earlier), citing both environmental and financial concerns and the uncertainties
identified in the GAO report. The funding that would have been used for HSR was
redirected toward highway and aviation projects, dealing a devastating blow to HSR.
In the Wake of FOX’s Demise: A Vision for Incremental HSR

In May 2000, Amtrak and FDOT issued the joint Florida Intercity Passenger Service Rail Vision
Plan. It took a different approach to HSR, focusing on incremental rather than new HSR,
and posited a business model partnering the State of Florida and Amtrak. When asked
about this shift, Nazih Haddad, Manager of Passenger Rail Development at FDOT,
explained that with the failure of FOX, FDOT felt it needed to do something because an
alternative to highways was still needed with demand for capacity continuing to increase.
He noted that incremental HSR made sense because “the bottom line issues of frequency of
service and travel time are more important than actual speed.”62
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An incremental approach to HSR in Florida has advocates. Al Harper, Chairman of EWM
Realtors, believes that new HSR may be “too expensive for what Florida ought to do right
now.” The competitiveness of the first leg of the system (Tampa–Orlando) is questionable
given that it is an 80-minute trip by car, and by rail it would be reduced only about 10
minutes.63 He argues that an incremental approach could be put in place faster, at a lesser
cost, and could help prove the marketability needed to expand the system further.64
Harper’s thoughts are echoed by Bob Vander Clute, Senior Vice President of Safety and
Operations at the Association of American Railroads. He notes that incremental HSR can
begin with existing ROWs and structures, saving both cost and time so people need not
wait many years to see progress—something quite important in a highly charged political
environment. While incremental rail will never achieve the speeds of new HSR, much can
still be done in terms of eliminating highway grade crossings, straightening curves, and
deploying supplementary signalization systems so that faster times and increased frequency
can be achieved and further built upon later.65
Citing the figures provided by Lynch and Polzin several years earlier, the Vision Plan noted
that further highway and air expansion to meet projected travel demand would face major
economic and environmental challenges. Although the FOX project was not implemented,
the benefits of rail were recognized by FDOT. The Vision Plan connected major urban
centers, tourist attractions, and intermodal transportation centers with the following
objectives:
• Delivery of quality, corridor-focused rail service quickly, implementing initial service
improvements by 2003
• Provision of continuous program improvement thereafter, including market
development, service quality, and network expansion
• Implementation of the program cost effectively and affordably, while minimizing and
managing financial, market, technological, and environmental risks
• Use of a wide range of partnerships to maximize customer and stakeholder support66
The Vision Plan identified two planning periods. The first would cover five years and
include immediate actions that could “…initiate quality passenger rail service in highdemand travel markets quickly with minimal capital investment.”67 The second period
would run 20 years, at the end of which Florida would have a well-integrated passenger rail
system serving communities throughout the state.
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The Vision Plan chose the Miami–Tampa–Orlando Corridor as the best one in which to
begin, noting that it was already served by an existing rail line, the distance between
endpoint stations was between 75 and 300 miles (making rail competitive with air and
automobile),68 and it had the largest current and projected markets. Working within
Amtrak’s Network Growth Strategy, which had assessed the potential for connecting the
national network to additional corridor service in partnership with states, the Vision Plan
laid out its 20-year strategy, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3 Florida DOT’s Strategy for Incremental HSR
Phase — to Be
Implemented by

Infrastructure and Service Modifications

Results

1 —2002–2003

Restructure long-distance passenger service
along lines included in its Network Growth
Strategy, mainly the Silver Star, Silver Meteor, and
Silver Palm services.
Provide direct service between Jacksonville and
Miami along Florida East Coast Railway (FEC).
Add more service between Tampa and
Jacksonville and new service between Orlando
and Tampa.

Increased service along
sections of the route.
Reduced travel time
between Miami and
Jacksonville; no time
saved on other routes.
Trains still limited to
79 mph.

2 — 2005

Introduce new intercity trains between Miami
and Orlando, Tampa and Orlando, and Tampa
and Miami along existing CSX ROWs.
Improvements to reduce bottlenecks and increase
safety.

Increased service along
sections of the route.
Trains still limited to
79 mph, but new
rolling stock capable of
110 mph, with multiple
amenities.

3 — 2015

New service between Orlando and Port
Speeds increased to
Canaveral on a new line between Jacksonville and 110 mph in certain
Orlando.
corridors.
Increase service between Miami and Orlando
along FEC.
Add stations.
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Table 3 Florida DOT’s Strategy for Incremental HSR (Continued)
Phase — to Be
Implemented by
4 — 2020

Infrastructure and Service Modifications

Results

Construct a new line between Naples and Fort
Fully integrated system
Lauderdale.
crossing the state.
Add service between Jacksonville and Pensacola.
Connect Tampa to St. Petersburg.

Florida Department of Transportation, Florida Intercity Passenger Rail Service Vision Plan—Executive Summary (1
May 2000).

Initial financing would be through joint investment by FDOT and Amtrak, with each
sharing initial capital costs (estimated at $278 to $393 million) equally.69 As shown in
Table 4, the Vision Plan anticipates immediate benefits within the first five years (Phase 1
and Phase 2) in terms of frequency of service.
Table 4 2000 and Proposed Year 2005 Intercity Rail Daily Round Trips
Markets

2000 Amtrak
Service

Proposed 2005 Service
Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3

Tampa–Orlando

0

2

6

8

Miami–Orlando

2

1

4

5

Tampa–Miami

1

1

1

2

Jacksonville–Orlando

2

3

0

3

Jacksonville–Tampa

1

3

0

3

Jacksonville–Miami

3

3

0

3

The Vision Plan remains in place and has some support, but many in Florida are skeptical of
incremental HSR. Advocates of new HSR, like Eugene Skoropowski, Managing Director,
Capitol Corridor Joint Powers Authority, BART, note that although passenger trains can be
run along existing tracks, there is a basic incompatibility above 80 mph because of
operations and safety issues. He also states that both new and incremental HSR can work,
but what can be achieved with each of them is different.70 (Interestingly, this theme is
repeated on both sides of the debate.) C.C. Dockery is even more emphatic in his concerns
that incremental HSR is not the right approach, arguing that it will never work if freight
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rail controls the tracks because freight is in business to profit from freight, not to service
tracks for passenger rail.71 Others point out that although an incremental approach may be
cheaper, it is still not cheap, and the issue of funding and public investment still need to be
resolved. Finally, as Senator Klein points out, finding political support for incremental rail
remains difficult because one still needs to make the case for a statewide benefit. With
either this approach or with new HSR built in segments (for example, Tampa–Orlando first,
then Miami, then other cities), many people do not see initial benefits where they live or
work and wonder if they will see a benefit to their region, given the costs and time
involved.72
Renewed Attempts to Implement New HSR—The Constitutional Amendment and the
Fluor-Bombardier Project

While FDOT was developing and releasing its Vision Plan, a parallel effort aimed at
implementing new HSR was still underway, led in large part by Dockery, a Florida citizen
who had been involved with HSR since the late 1970s. A firm believer in the need for new
HSR in Florida and a board member of the FHSRA, Dockery initially had been involved
with the issue as an observer as his friend and colleague, Governor Graham, pressed for it.
Dockery then worked with the campaign of Governor Bob Martinez (R, 1987–1991) and
was appointed by the latter to the Florida High-Speed Rail Commission, of which he
eventually became chairman, until it was abolished by Governor Chiles. In 2000, the
Florida legislature authorized another feasibility study, initially titled the Coast-to-Coast Rail
Feasibility Study and later renamed the Cross-State Rail Feasibility Study, to be conducted by
STV, Inc. At the same time, the legislature asked voters to decide on a constitutional
amendment, drafted by Dockery, that directed the legislature to develop and operate a highspeed ground transportation system, with speeds above 120 mph and with construction
beginning on or before November 1, 2003.
The amendment to the Constitution passed with 52.7 percent of the popular vote, although
regional differences existed: On a county-by-county basis, 30 counties voted in favor and 37
against the amendment.73 Article X, Section 19 stipulated that:
To reduce traffic congestion and provide alternatives to the traveling public,
it is hereby declared to be in the public interest that a high speed ground
transportation system consisting of a monorail, fixed guideway or magnetic
levitation system, capable of speeds in excess of 120 miles per hour, be
developed and operated in the State of Florida to provide high speed ground
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transportation by innovative, efficient and effective technologies consisting of
dedicated rails or guideways separated from motor vehicular traffic that will
link the five largest urban areas of the State as determined by the Legislature
and provide for access to existing air and ground transportation facilities and
services. The Legislature, the Cabinet and the Governor are hereby directed
to proceed with the development of such a system by the State and/or by a
private entity pursuant to state approval and authorization, including the
acquisition of right-of-way, the financing of design and construction of the
system, and the operation of the system, as provided by specific appropriation
and by law, with construction to begin on or before November 1, 2003.74
The legislature enacted the Florida High-Speed Rail Authority Act, creating the Florida
High-Speed Rail Authority (FHSRA) in June 2001. Composed of a nine-member board,
with three appointees each from the governor, the Senate, and the House, the FHSRA was
charged with locating, planning, designing, financing, constructing, maintaining, owning,
operating, administering, and managing HSR in the state. It was further authorized to
“seek and obtain federal matching funds or any other funds to fulfill the requirements of
this act either directly or through the Department of Transportation.”75 It appeared that
progress was again being made.
That same month STV, Inc., submitted its final coast-to-coast report to FDOT, providing an
assessment of route and technology alternatives, estimated costs, and ridership potentials for
an HSR corridor linking St. Petersburg, Tampa, and Orlando. The report’s final
recommendation was to move ahead with what was considered the Minimum Operable
Segment (MOS) required for a successful system startup, that is a nonelectrified high-speed
technology operating at speeds of up to 150 mph, connecting Orlando and Tampa along the
Interstate 4 alignment. The end points in each city would be Orlando International Airport
and Tampa Union Station, with intermediate station stops at Disney World, the Orange
County Convention Center, and Lakeland. STV recommended “no more planning studies,”
and the authors of the report strongly urged that “the State not engage in another planning
study in order to create the perception of moving forward.” In their words, “It is now time
to begin the more refined engineering and environmental analyses that will move this
project forward in the event that federal funding is secured for implementation.”76 The
study also recommended that preliminary engineering and environmental work activities
start and an investment-grade ridership study be developed. The FHSRA proceeded
accordingly, initiating a Project, Development, and Environment (PD&E) Study in late
2001 for Phase 1, Part 1 of Florida’s HSR system. (Phase 1, Part 2 would extend the line
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from Tampa to St. Petersburg; Phase 2 would be the final extension between Orlando and
Miami.)
The first report of the FHSRA to the governor was made in 2002. Later that year (on
October 7), the FHSRA issued a request for proposals for the design, build, operation,
maintenance, and finance (DBOM&F) of a high-speed ground transportation system for
Phase 1, Part 1 of an HSR system from Tampa to Orlando.77 Around that same time, the
FHSRA also released several documents as part of the PD&E Study, including the Florida
High-Speed Rail: Screening Report, prepared by Parsons PBS&J (October 2002) and the
Investment Grade Ridership Study, prepared by AECOM Consulting and Wilbur Smith
Associates (November 2002). The former documented the initial decision-making process
used to determine which segments within the potential corridors between Orlando and
Tampa would be moved forward for further analysis. It also reviewed the need, purpose, and
markets for HSR in Florida, noting the following in particular:
• Tourist travel—studies consistently demonstrated that visitors to the Orlando area also
visit either or both of the Gulf and Atlantic coastal areas.
• Commuters—previous reports documented a trend toward residents willing to travel 30
to 60 minutes to their jobs, a trend that was expected to continue.
• Businesses—six industrial clusters were identified (aviation and aerospace; information
technology; medical technologies; microelectronics modeling; simulation and training;
optics and photonics), all needing to bring employees to and from their places of
business.
• Freight movement—the Interstate 4 corridor is a gateway to the Port of Tampa and
provides connections to urban areas throughout the state; moving passenger rail off the
same tracks used by freight would benefit both.78
The Investment Grade Ridership Study provided ridership and ticket revenue forecasts for two
potential alignments. The report began with a description of base conditions and expected
demographic trends that would warrant HSR. The study predicted that total corridor
population would increase 33 percent between 2002 and 2025. The Orlando region,
including Orange, Seminole, and Osceola Counties, was expected to increase by 46 percent
during this same period; the Tampa Bay region, including Hillsborough, Pasco, and
Pinellas Counties, by 23 percent; and Polk County by 38 percent.79 Employment during
that same 23-year period was expected to increase by 46 percent, and hotel rooms (a
measure to estimate growth of visitor travel) was estimated to increase 83 percent, with the
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highest increase in the Orlando region.80 The tremendous growth potential was not limited
to population and hotel rooms. Forecasts for air passengers at Orlando International Airport
(OIA) showed steady growth through 2010, and estimates out another 15 years suggested a
93 percent increase, for a total of 52 million passengers per year by 2025.81 When matched
against the existing transportation system in Florida, it was clear that the tremendous
projected growth in population, employment, and tourism would quickly outpace the
system’s highway and air capacity.
In August 2003, after two of the four proposals submitted were found to be preliminarily
responsive to the 2002 Request for Proposals,82 a Draft Environmental Impact Statement
(DEIS) was issued for the Tampa-to-Orlando HSR, noting that “the purpose of the proposed
project is to enhance passenger mobility between Tampa and Orlando” and that such
mobility “is viewed as essential for the sustained economic growth of the region, as well as
the quality of life of the region’s residents and visitors.”83 It further argued that while
current transportation demand between the two cities was primarily met through the
highway system, that system “is already operating at or near capacity during an extended
peak hour of each day, and although capacity improvements…are either currently underway
or planned for the near future, they are considered interim, ‘first phase’ improvements.”84
The DEIS considered several alternatives in meeting the forecasted demand via HSR:
• A no-build option that would provide no alternative travel mode to buses and
automobiles
• Two technology alternatives
• gas-turbine-powered, locomotive-hauled trains with passenger equipment similar to
Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor Acela (Fluor Bombardier)
• an electric-powered, locomotive-hauled train similar to the French TGV (Global
Rail Consortium)
• Four alignment alternatives (see Table 5)
Table 5 Tampa-Orlando DEIS Alignment Choices
Alignment

Tampa

TampaOrlando

Orlando

A

I-275/I-4

I-4

Bee Line Expressway/Taft-Vineland Rd.

B

I-275/I-4

I-4

S.R. 536/Central Florida Greeneway
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Table 5 Tampa-Orlando DEIS Alignment Choices (Continued)
Alignment

Tampa

TampaOrlando

Orlando

C

CSX Line/I-75

I-4

Bee Line Expressway/Taft-Vineland Rd.

D

CSX Line/I-75

I-4

S.R. 536/Central Florida Greeneway

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration and FHSRA, “Draft Environmental Impact
Statement: Florida High-Speed Rail–Tampa to Orlando” (August 2003), p. S-6.

At a minimum, the DEIS stipulated an HSR system that would operate 12 round trips
daily, 7 days a week, from 6 A.M. to 8 P.M., at speeds of at least 120 mph. Each train would
need to accommodate at least 250 passengers, with a travel time between Tampa and
Orlando of 70 minutes. New tracks would be laid for the majority of the segment for any
alignment. After taking into account the potential impacts and revenues for each of the
technologies, running in each of the four possible alignments, the FHSRA named FluorBombardier as the first-ranked proposer and selected the Greeneway as the preferred
alignment in Orlando, noting that the environmental impacts for both Orlando alignments
were similar but the Greeneway alignment offered a potential for higher ridership revenues,
lower cost, and the least financial risk.85 (In terms of the overall choices, Alignment B is the
preferred alignment, but agreement is still needed from the Orlando-Orange County
Expressway Authority.) The FHSRA executed a contract with Fluor-Bombardier to provide
professional services in support of the completion of a Final EIS (FEIS), to be conducted at
no cost to the FSHRA or the state.86 Work on the FEIS began in January 2004. At the same
time, the FHSRA began negotiations with Fluor-Bombardier regarding potential changes
to the latter’s proposal that would incorporate some of the attributes of the second-ranked
proposal, in particular the addition of a second track to Disney World.87
The Fluor-Bombardier Proposal

Like the earlier FOX proposal, the Fluor-Bombardier proposal is based on a public-private
partnership that will provide a “privately developed and operated public facility that will be
owned by the [FHSR] Authority.”88 Team members include Fluor Corporation;
Bombardier, Inc.; Skanska-Granite-Lane, Joint Venture; Hubbard Construction Company;
Martin K. Eby Construction Company, Inc.; Marta Track Constructors, Inc.; HDR
Engineering, Inc; and Lehman Brothers. The base proposal, before the changes being
negotiated, offered a single track, located in the median of Interstate 4 between Tampa and
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the Osceola/Orange County border, with a double track in the Greeneway median from the
border to the Orlando International Airport.
The financial plan places initial ridership revenue risk on the private sector and guarantees
operations and maintenance costs for the first seven years of service. Figure 8 shows the
proposed cash flow for the first full year of operation.89 While the firm fixed price is
$2.06 billion for construction, with the private sector responsible for any cost overruns, the
FHSRA estimates a total cost of $2.38 billion once ROW, environmental mitigation, and
other contingencies are factored in.90 State contributions of $75 million annually would pay
for infrastructure, and Fluor has proposed the use of Tax Credit Bonds to leverage annual
state appropriations to finance the track and systems. Rolling stock would be financed using
a combination of federal grants and tax-exempt bonds, again repaid from ridership revenues.
Operations and maintenance would be financed by ridership revenues and backed by a
$50 million credit from the Fluor team, although the contract may be reopened for
negotiation after seven years if ridership projections are not met.
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Tax Credit Bond Sinking
Fund - $48M

$13M

Capital Renewal
Investment - $13M

$5

Coverage (Surplus)

Rolling Stock/Systems
Maintenance - $15M
Civil Infrastructure
Maintenance - $11M

Returned to Authority
for Future Phases
$35M

Operations Cost
$23M

M

$2
1M

$14M

$14M

$49M

$49M
$75M

Fare Box Revenue

$14M

Holding Company

State
Appropriation
$75M

$48M
$48M

Tax-Exempt Revenue
Bonds - $5M

Standby Credit
$50M

Coverage (Surplus)
$21M

$21M

Figure 8 Proposed Cash Flow in First Full Year of Operation
Current Status

By the end of 2003, the Florida Legislature had authorized $14 million for the HSR project,
but then Governor Bush vetoed $5 million of those funds and stated he would not support
further new HSR efforts.91 As mentioned earlier, he and the State CFO, Thomas Gallagher
(who is also currently Chair of Derail the Bullet Train), actively engaged in the campaign to
repeal the amendment in November 2004. By June 1, 2004, they had 54,774 signatures
deemed valid, but for the repeal to appear on the November 2004 ballot, they needed
488,722 signatures.92 On June 2, 2004, Dockery filed a “Complaint for Injunctive Relief
and Petition for Writ of Mandamus,” against Secretary of State Glenda Hood, demanding
the invalidation of a number of the validated signatures, arguing that they were not
obtained according to Florida State Law.93 By November, however, enough signatures were
declared valid that the repeal was placed on the ballot and was overwhelmingly supported in
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the November 2004 general elections, with 63.7 percent voting for the repeal.94
Nevertheless, as Dockery points out, this was not necessarily a vote to kill the concept of
HSR in Florida, since prior legislation still exists and other avenues are still being
followed.95 According to Gary Brosch, Executive Director, Coast2Coast Rail Consortium
and Chair of the National Center for Transit Research at the University of South Florida, the
FHSRA met recently and decided to continue moving ahead with plans for HSR between
Tampa and Orlando despite the repeal of the amendment.96
Prior to the repeal, the FHSRA had been negotiating with the Orlando Orange County
Expressway Authority (OOCEA) and Walt Disney World in order to use the preferred
(Greeneway) route.97 In February 2004, the OOCEA agreed to begin an assessment of HSR
using the ROW along the Greeneway if the FHSRA would pay for any costs incurred as a
result of conducting the study. The OOCEA was clear that their agreement to assess the
HSR option does not constitute their willingness to allow the use of their ROW nor will it
necessarily result in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), which is needed for the Record
of Decision to be issued by the Federal Railroad Administration.98 In the most recent
pronouncement by the FHSRA that they would continue to move ahead on HSR, the
Authority also decided to change the preferred alignment from Greeneway to the Bee Line,
which would serve Universal Studios.99
Fluor Bombardier continued to advance its plans, announcing that Virgin Group (Virgin
Rail and Airlines) had agreed to join the team. Virgin Group, which has extensive
experience with HSR operations in the United Kingdom, would operate and market HSR
in Florida if the project is realized.100 However, with the voter repeal of the HSR
amendment in 2004, the situation has become more complex as the FHSRA has agreed to
reconsider the proposal by Global Rail Consortium, initially ranked second behind Fluor
Bombardier, because they are offering additional private sector investment.101
FDOT remains committed to its Vision Plan and intends to move ahead with Amtrak on
Phase 1, the extension of Amtrak’s national service. The state has committed $64 million to
the project, and FDOT has begun negotiating with Florida East Coast Railway (FEC) over
issues arising from use of FEC ROW. Negotiations were put on hold, in part because of the
parallel effort aimed at new HSR and in part because of a change in the national legal and
political climate when David Gunn assumed leadership of Amtrak. The focus of the
national passenger rail system shifted from expansion to achieving a state-of-good-repair on
lines owned by Amtrak. Furthermore, Amtrak was directed by the U.S. DOT to cease and
desist on any expansion and planning for expansion as a condition of a $100 million
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Railroad Rehabilitation and Infrastructure Funding (RRIF) loan to Amtrak in June 2002.
This restriction, which was included in Amtrak’s appropriations for FY2003 and FY2004,
combined with the reluctance by the State of Florida to fund infrastructure improvements,
has left the FEC initiative in limbo.102 However, according to Haddad, there have been
signals that this may soon be resolved so they can implement Phase 1 of the Vision Plan.103
Assessment of the Case

For 30 years, the state of Florida has pursued HSR in one form or another. Each time
progress is made, setbacks occur and the process begins again. The situation now appears to
be more of a stalemate with three discernible positions: those advocating new HSR, those
opposed to all HSR plans, and those who want an incremental approach. How to best end
this stalemate, and whether the current Fluor Bombardier HSR project will be built, is
unclear. However, Florida’s experience offers some powerful lessons and themes for
consideration for HSR elsewhere in the country.
Cost and Financing

The issue of cost and financing in the Florida case has several dimensions. In the immediate
debate over cost, the central concern is the business model and who should bear the risk for
a project that is described as having a public benefit but looking for private dollars. The
private sector wants the state to bear more of the risk; the state wants the private sector and
the federal government to assume more risk.
Further complicating the question of who will pay is Florida’s long-standing bias against
taxes. Florida ranks 33rd among states in terms of per capita state and local tax burden and
collects no income tax. The proportion of personal income spent on taxes in Florida is the
sixth lowest in the country.104 If HSR is to be built, public funds are needed, but how to
raise such funds in an antitax environment, particularly when many people are skeptical of
the public benefit, is a critical dilemma.
Another dimension of the cost and financing issue relates to how costs and benefits are
measured. There is a tendency in the United States to look at financing HSR as bottom-line
driven, identifying capital and operational costs on one side and revenues on the other. As
long as this is the case, the United States is unlikely to see HSR in any form.105 A broader
view of costs and benefits—one that considers costs borne by the public as a result of
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capacity increases in other forms of transport should a no-build option be taken—often
results in a very different mixture of economic results.106
Finally, there is a fundamental issue related to the role of the federal government and what
several people have deemed the myth that railroads can pay for themselves, even when this
is rarely the case. The various proposals put forth in Florida have been expected to show how
HSR can pay for itself, although there is no credible evidence that total self-sufficiency can
be achieved. Such plans have been met with skepticism by those opposed to HSR, as well as
by some who want to see HSR implemented in Florida but believe that public support is
needed. All the proposals have included some federal monies in their cost estimates and
projections; however, federal funding is unlikely to be available, given the historical
reluctance to invest in rail. Federal reluctance to help subsidize rail, even as it aids air,
highways, and other modes, trickles down to state and local governments. Thus, without
more federal support for such projects, they are unlikely to succeed in the near future.
The Approach and the Need for Clear Goals Around Which a Consensus Can Be Built

Another theme for consideration and potential lesson learned in Florida relates to the
implementation approach being pursued, namely new HSR versus incremental HSR. In the
United States, both new and incremental HSR projects have been presented. No new HSR
systems have been implemented, but examples of incremental HSR exist (Northeast
Corridor Acela and the Empire Corridor Turbotrain), and several others are underway (in the
Pacific Northwest and the Chicago Hub). All the incremental HSR projects are, or are
planned to be, supported by public funds.
The needs and goals identified determine the best approach for a particular area. In Florida,
beyond the discussions of costs and time is an undercurrent of dissension over the exact need
and goals for HSR. Advocates of new HSR speak of the need to eliminate or mitigate
congestion, but opponents strongly believe that in a state with little passenger rail or
transit, there are other ways to alleviate congestion that might be both more effective and
less costly. As Heidi Eddins, Executive Vice President and General Counsel of FEC, notes, if
the ultimate goal is to have an integrated and comprehensive transportation system for
Florida, it “makes no sense to start at the end, and that is what [the new HSR project] is
doing.”107 She argues that to relieve congestion and move people from cars to public transit,
including rail and bus, the key is to offer more commuter options focused on reliability,
frequency of service, and accessibility. The proposed new HSR system along a relatively
short segment, with few stops, would not offer this.
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Even among those who support new HSR in Florida, there is concern over the current
choice of corridor. As Ron Hartman, Executive Vice President of Yellow Transportation,
points out, the real time savings and revenue-generating possibilities are found on the
longer trip to Miami, and “the Tampa–Orlando corridor, without the Miami link, is hard to
justify.”108 Eugene Skoropowski notes that building new HSR between Tampa and Orlando
is “like building a tree without the trunk. Will a train be nice in that corridor? Yes. Will it
be able to demonstrate the real capacity of HSR? Not until it is expanded to include
Miami.”109
The current project, like those before it, appears to be caught in an impasse because it has
been whittled down to a portion of the route that even some proponents find hard to
support in the current political and economic climate. This relates to the ongoing debate
over whom the current HSR will serve in Florida. Many believe that the key constituencies
being served by the initial corridor are tourists and the related private sector industries,
leading them back to the question of why public funds should be used. Private support
among those who would most benefit by the Tampa–Orlando HSR is not as strong as one
might imagine. During the earlier FOX project, Orlando International Airport was an
active supporter of HSR (and continues to be) but many of the tourist attractions, notably
Walt Disney World, were decidedly neutral in their reactions, waiting to see what
alignments might be used. During the current discussions, Disney is more supportive of the
project and negotiating with the FHSRA now that the alignment would include a stop at
Disney World. However, Orlando Universal Studios was actively engaged in the Derail the
Bullet Train efforts, contributing more than $220,000 to the campaign.110
The Political Arena

In several other cases, most notably the Texas TGV experience, specific interest groups were
much involved in preventing HSR plans from being implemented. In Florida, specific
interest groups have also played a role at times. In the case of FOX, for example,
environmental groups and land developers both voiced strong opposition to the MiamiOrlando routing, citing concerns over the Everglades (although in the latter case, this may
have had to do more with the possibility of losing potential areas for development if the
HSR line was put in place). The small airport authorities, which had been developing plans
for expansion to serve as feeders to the larger airports, opposed HSR as a competitor. The
role of the major airlines is more ambiguous. Furthermore, in the latest round of discussions
regarding HSR, special interest groups do not seem to be playing as pivotal a role in the
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overall discussions and debates as are key members of the legislature and executive branch,
and the agencies and authorities involved.
The politics surrounding HSR in Florida are bipartisan, with opponents and proponents
found on both sides of the political fence, and a somewhat disjointed process with multiple
ideas being put forth and none being realized. Both Democratic and Republican governors,
for example, have been critical to getting HSR projects underway and to stopping those
projects under later administrations. Efforts to support the 2000 Constitutional
amendment, as well as those aimed at repealing it, have been sponsored by both Republican
and Democratic legislators.
Several individuals in key leadership positions have changed their stance on HSR, in
particular Governor Bush and Thomas Gallagher. Before becoming Florida’s CFO and
current chair of the Derail the Bullet Train, Gallagher had voted to support HSR. Bush,
while perhaps never a full advocate, was much less opposed to HSR before taking office, and
some felt he was supportive of FOX. Why their stances shifted is unclear (their offices did
not respond to requests for interviews); however, in the more recent discussions between
FHSRA and Fluor Bombardier, Florida’s bid for the 2012 Olympics may have played a role.
Tampa was being supported as a potential site for the Olympics, but it would have needed
the hotel capacity found in Orlando and quick and efficient transportation to get there.
Thus, HSR found support in quarters it might not have otherwise. One cannot know for
certain whether HSR would have been implemented if Tampa had been selected for the
Olympics, but it offers a glimpse of the possibility that a key rallying point could have
made a difference.
Individual personalities have played an important role, both positively and negatively, in
shaping and modifying Florida’s HSR experience for three decades. Governor Graham first
launched Florida on its HSR path, with his unwavering belief that Florida needed a system
similar to the Japanese Shinkansen. Many people were involved in the studies, proposals, and
plans, but it was Governor Chiles who terminated them. Eight years later, Governor Bush
was a critical stopping point for HSR, and some have wondered whether personality clashes
with FOX leaders may have played a role here. Key personalities need not be in top
leadership positions. C.C. Dockery has been involved in advocating HSR for several decades.
He authored the recently repealed amendment and helped define the spirit in which it has
been interpreted, that is, new HSR.
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While the nuances are not all evident, it is apparent from the Florida case that, given the
time to develop and implement HSR, continuous leadership and support is critical. More
important, this leadership and support needs to be institutional in nature. Studies and plans
often span several administrations, and Florida shows how easily efforts can be curtailed by a
single person.
More important, but related, thus far the Constitutional amendment itself could not
guarantee sufficient support to implement HSR. In a political climate heavily affected by
personalities and lacking an institutional support structure with sufficient autonomy
regarding funds, responsibility, and authority, the amendment has become one more item
that is placed at the forefront of the debate by some and ignored by others. When asked
what will happen now that the November 2004 elections are over and how best to overcome
the HSR impasse, the answer often given is that proponents of HSR will probably have to
wait until a more pro-HSR governor replaces Bush. At the least, everyone will need to wait
until the legislature decides in 2005 whether to provide additional funding for plans in
progress.

CALIFORNIA
Despite several well-publicized problems, California is one of the few U.S. states that is
promoting high-speed passenger rail and moving ahead to make it happen. Figure 9 shows
a rough approximation of the proposed California Corridor.
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Figure 9 California Corridor

California has three Amtrak corridors: the Los Angeles–San Diego Corridor, the Capital
Corridor between Oakland and Sacramento, and the San Joaquin Service connecting
Bakersfield, Stockton, Oakland, and Sacramento. Funding for each line is predominantly
provided by the state, with federal and local governments, Amtrak, and the railroads
making up most of the remainder.111
In terms of commuter rail, two major developments affect the development of incremental
high-speed rail in California:
• Public agencies have assumed control from the railroads over some tracks.
• Successful commuter systems have resulted in a fundamental change in public attitudes
about passenger rail.
In 2004, the Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (Caltrain) inaugurated faster commuter
trains called “Baby Bullets” that reduce the 1-hour-36-minute travel time from San
Francisco to San Jose to less than 1 hour, comparing favorably with automobile travel. This
is the only California commuter rail service that has emphasized high speed. The trains
travel no faster than 79 mph, but the new grade separations, bypass tracks at stations,
improved track throughout the system, and limited stops allow more efficient operation.
Baby Bullets were supported by State Senator Jackie Speier, a Democrat from Hillsborough.
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Her Peninsula constituents benefit from improved connections to San Francisco and San
Jose. She obtained $127 million in traffic congestion relief funds from the state to build
bypass track and to buy six new locomotives and seventeen cars. Other local and grant
money went toward improvement in the line’s signal system, track upgrades, and an
overhaul of two stations.112
In terms of high-speed rail specifically, California has pursued two fronts:
• Incremental improvement of existing rail lines to provide faster, more frequent
passenger rail service
• Advanced plans for a completely new rail system on dedicated, high-speed rails, to
provide genuinely high-speed service competitive with air passenger service
The two fronts are largely separate, with little overlap in the organizational structure.
Current incremental plans and projects do not depend on high-speed rail plans and projects.
However, the history of intercity and commuter rail in California demonstrates support and
some willingness to fund rail service as an alternative to the automobile. The support comes
both from government agencies at state, regional, and local levels and from the public, as
demonstrated by successful ballot measures to provide funding.
The California High-Speed Rail Authority

The positive reaction of automobile-dependent Californians to two 1990 rail transit bond
issues (Propositions 108 and 116) encouraged transportation thinkers and legislators to
consider a more ambitious plan—to connect the San Francisco Bay Area with the Los
Angeles area by a dedicated high-speed rail system. The distance is less than 500 miles,
within the theoretical range where high-speed ground transportation could compete with
air.
HSR innovators in the legislature included state senators Quentin Kopp, Jim Costa,
Richard Katz, Jim Mills, and Rebecca Morgan; Bay Area political leaders included Rod
Diridon, Chair of the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors; Representative Lynn Schenk
from San Diego was also involved. Given term limits and the passage of time, all have left
office. Nongovernmental organizations included the Planning and Conservation League.
Several private tours were organized for the legislators and local officials to visit and ride
HSR lines in Japan (Shinkansen), Germany (InterCity Express–ICE), and France (Train à

Mineta Transportation Institute

High-Speed Rail Case Studies

53

Grande Vitesse–TGV). All three systems feature state-of-the-art electric trains on exclusive,
dedicated rights-of-way, operating at speeds between 150 and 190 mph.
The first formal step was the legislature’s move in 1994 to create the High-Speed Rail
Commission, which was directed to conduct a feasibility study of HSR in California and
report back to the legislature. The feasibility study was completed in 1996, and the
commission reported that a high-speed rail system in California was feasible. As a result, the
California legislature enacted Senate Bill 1420, effective September 24, 1996, as California
Public Utilities Code Sections 185000, et seq. The leadership of Independent State Senator
Quentin Kopp of San Francisco was essential. Governor Pete Wilson was unenthusiastic but
deferred to Senator Kopp. The High-Speed Rail Commission eventually became an
Authority, allowing substantial autonomy and power under California law.
The legislature required the California High-Speed Rail Authority (CHSRA) to prepare a
business plan, which was completed in June 2000. As a result of legislative approval of the
CHSRA Final Business Plan, the Authority mandate was extended. To date, the CHSRA
has resisted attempts to bring it under the control of the California Department of
Transportation (Caltrans), so it operates independently.
The CHSRA proposes to build a
…high-speed train system for intercity travel in California between the
major metropolitan centers of Sacramento and the San Francisco Bay Area in
the north, through the Central Valley, to Los Angeles and San Diego in the
south...projected to carry as many as 68 million passengers annually by the
year 2020...speeds in excess of 200 miles per hour...on a fully grade-separated
track, with state-of-the-art safety, signaling, and automated control
systems.113
Electric propulsion is recommended.
The updated 2000 Business Plan estimated $25 billion. The first phase, the so-called Starter
Line from Los Angeles to San Francisco, is planned to cost $14 to 15 billion. Additional
lines later will extend to Sacramento from Los Angeles, to Sacramento from San Francisco,
and from Los Angeles to San Diego.
The legislature authorized $20 million for a comprehensive environmental study. The
CHSRA and the FRA completed the draft Environmental Impact Report/Environmental
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Impact Statement (EIR/EIS) on January 20, 2004. Public hearings were held in Sacramento,
Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, San Jose, and Fresno. Comments from the public
were published by CHSRA on October 7, 2004.114
A preliminary study conducted before 1999 by technical engineers had recommended
against the Altamont Pass Corridor for operational reasons; therefore, the draft document
did not fully analyze that corridor. Testimony received during the hearings suggested
interest in the Altamont Corridor and the possibility of another corridor in the Pacheco Pass
area. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) encouraged the CHSRA Board to conduct
more detailed studies of the access between the Central Valley and the Bay Area. Assuming
that additional funding is provided in the 2005-2006 state budget, the additional study
should be complete for hearings, and the full document, now called a Program Level
Environmental Clearance, could be certified by the CHSRA Board in the spring of 2006.
Among other issues, the EIR/EIS examines the No-Project Alternative: What happens if we
do nothing? The number of passengers traveling intercity in California is forecasted to
increase up to 63 percent over the next 20 years; the state’s population is projected to
increase by 31 percent by 2020.115 New population estimates are forthcoming.
The No-Project Alternative would result in an intercity transportation
network that would not be as safe as, would have increased travel times, and
would be significantly less reliable than existing conditions....would also
exacerbate...energy use and dependence on petroleum...would result in
environmental impacts...gridlock on the highways and airports.116
Another alternative is the Modal Alternative, that is, further expansion of highways and
airports but no HSR. The Modal Alternative would produce greater environmental impact
and would not be as safe or reliable as the high-speed alternative.117 Any modal alternative
would require the taking of far more land for highways and airports than any HSR
alternative. In the original Business Plan, the CHSRA estimated that the complete HSR
project would cost $37 billion. It would cost $82 billion to expand the highway network
and the airports to accommodate as many passengers as HSR would carry.
The original schedule for certification had assumed placing bonds for the Starter Line on the
state ballot in November 2004. Delay in certification became less significant when
California’s deepening fiscal crisis caused Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and the
legislature to place a $15 billion bailout bond on that ballot. Voters also had authorized
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$4 billion in education bonds in March 2004, and the public willingness to support the
HSR bonds might have been tested. With the consent of the CHSRA Board, the legislature
and the governor agreed to delay the HSR bonds to what they presume will be a more
favorable November 2006 ballot.
Some political forces wanted to delay the HSR bond vote until 2008. However, such a
lengthy delay would invalidate the EIR/EIS already completed, and the expensive procedure
would have to begin anew. The CHSRA stated that a delay to 2008 probably would kill the
entire HSR idea. That the legislature followed this reasoning could indicate fundamental
support among current California legislators for the project. There will undoubtedly be
competing causes for voter support whatever year is chosen.
Federal action is uncertain. California expects about $18 billion in support from the TEA21 renewal legislation, which at present is speculative. California Congressional members
have stated that they would try to couple federal HSR funding with a designation as a “new
industry,” or perhaps as a “demonstration” project. The latter cannot be downgraded or
ignored by the bureaucracy.
Construction was scheduled to begin in 2008-2009, but will have to await voter action in
2006. SYSTRA—a joint venture of Bechtel, Parsons-Brinckerhoff, and others—is waiting
in the wings. There seems to be a genuine hope, based on an economic analysis prepared for
the CHSRA, that the Starter Line will generate funds to build further lines.118
So far, organized opposition to California HSR has been light. Southwest Airlines, a
vehement opponent of high-speed rail in Texas, has been quiet in California. The only major
political opponent has been State Senator Tom McClintock, the unsuccessful Republican
opponent to Governor Schwarzenegger in the 2003 recall and election. McClintock favors
only highway projects.
Those who support HSR but want it to serve parochial interests create more serious
difficulty. The Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), L.A.
County Supervisor Mike Antonovich, L.A. City Councilman and mayoral candidate
Antonio Villaraigosa, and other politicians want the HSR route to go far to the east via
Palmdale and Tehachapi. This was the route of the Southern Pacific’s San Joaquin Daylight,
which took 4-1/2 long hours to travel from Los Angeles to Bakersfield. A recent public
hearing in Los Angeles produced no enthusiastic supporters of high-speed rail; only public
officials from Palmdale were present. Palmdale activists want a high-speed connection
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between Los Angeles International Airport and the Palmdale Intercontinental Airport,
which the Los Angeles Department of Airports wants to promote. High-speed rail to the
Bay Area is not their focus.
The CHSRA prefers a direct route over the mountains from Los Angeles to Bakersfield. This
is the highway route known as the Grapevine or the Ridge Route. Caltrans built I-5 over
this difficult terrain because it is the most logical route. CHSRA believes likewise, since the
purpose is to transport people rapidly between the Los Angeles Area and the Bay Area, not
to service intermediate, out-of-the-way towns. So far there has been little opposition to the
Grapevine route as a result of its planned tunnel crossing of the infamous San Andreas Fault.
The EIR/EIS discusses this issue, but scientific study could be trumped by sensationalism if
a major earthquake hits. Geologists and the authorities are aware of the Palmdale Bulge, a
detectable rise in the earth, which signifies potential movement along the San Andreas
Fault between Los Angeles and Bakersfield. CHSRA can point out that the 1989 Loma
Prieta earthquake in the Bay Area destroyed highway structures, including part of the
critical Bay Bridge, but did not harm any rail tunnels, such as BART’s Trans-Bay tube.
Train Riders of California (TRAC), a small, nonprofit group, has voiced opposition to the
proposed route linking the Bay Area over the coastal mountains to the San Joaquin Valley.
While TRAC fundamentally supports incremental improvements to existing rail lines, it
considers HSR to be a diversion of resources.119 Several public agencies also are concerned
about diversion of resources. The Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA)
“...is concerned that...the [high-speed train] HST system will divert already limited state
and federal funding from Metrolink projects. The HST system should not be funded in lieu
of funding for expansion of the Metrolink system.”120 The Southern California Association
of Governments (SCAG), which favors Maglev technology, states: “SCAG is concerned
about the use of such existing local funds and state transportation revenue sources.”121 The
MTA in Los Angeles, one of five SCRRA members, states: “The proposed project should not
divert critical state and federal funding for MTA’s surface transportation programs.”122 The
San Joaquin Council of Governments in Stockton worried: “The cost of the HSR may delay
other critically needed transportation improvements.”123 Political leadership will be
necessary to overcome such interagency concerns.
Environmentalists and the California Department of Parks and Recreation oppose the
proposed route through the Henry Coe State Park and the Orestimba Wilderness east of
Gilroy, and do not like the alternate proposal through neighboring Pacheco Pass.124 The
CHRSA maintains that environmentally friendly construction can be done through the
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Pacheco Pass, where a four-lane highway already exists, or even through Henry Coe State
Park under Mt. Hamilton. Either of those routes is necessary in order to route the HSR from
San Francisco through San Jose, over (or under) the hills, into the San Joaquin Valley. Some
environmentalists prefer a route over the Altamont Pass, but this route is to the north of San
Jose, which then would be served by a secondary line instead of the HSR main line. San Jose
is the third-largest city in California, the tenth-largest in the nation, and the center of
Silicon Valley, an important producer of economic activity and jobs. In making the original
choice of the Pacheco Pass option, the CHSRA determined that a more direct line to San
Jose saves time and has higher potential to attract passengers. “The CHSRA and the Bay
Area Metropolitan Transportation Commission recommended dropping the Altamont Pass
alternative route in 1999, and reaffirmed that decision in 2003.”125 The Altamont Pass
alternative also would require a new bridge across the lower San Francisco Bay, in the
middle of a marine sanctuary, guaranteeing intervention from environmental interests. The
continuing environmental work is focusing more analysis on the Altamont Pass alternative
and another more southerly option.
It appears that most political forces support HSR in principle. Legislative leaders such as
state senators Burton and Murray are active supporters, although under California’s strict
term limits, Burton left office in 2004. The Senate Transportation Committee has taken
leadership for HSR. The press has been favorable, although not passionate. The Sierra Club
had been a supporter, until some members became embroiled in the debate over Altamont
Pass versus Pacheco Pass.126
The Business Plan estimated that “nearly two-thirds of Californians already endorse
building a high-speed system and would be willing to pay for its construction.” That may
be, although this estimate is a result of a poll which asked simply if the respondent
approved or disapproved. The estimate might be different if HSR were to be ranked with
other projects such as public school construction, medical care for seniors, tax reduction, and
police and fire protection.
CHSRA Executive Director Mehdi Morshed is optimistic about the chances of success. He
believes that there is political momentum and that California voters will respond to the
innovative, high-tech nature of the project. The voters will find it on the 2006 ballot, unless
the legislature ultimately moves it to the 2008 ballot.
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Observations

A few preliminary observations may be drawn from the California experience:
• Leadership is critical. There was leadership in the California Legislature at several stages
in rail development, including the successful 1990 bond issues and in the moves to
create the CHSRA. It remains to be seen whether strong pro-HSR leadership will be in
place in 2006 when the HSR bonds will be on the ballot. HSR success at that point
might depend on the strong support of Governor Schwarzenegger and on his impact on
voters at the time. As with any California election, the ability of supporters to raise the
funding for a strong statewide campaign will be a factor.
• Seeing is believing. When politicians or other leaders visit and ride existing HSR
systems (Shinkansen, ICE, TGV), they return enthusiastic. Major political leaders in
California have made such visits, but not at state expense. The same might be true of the
traveling public. The international nature of many California businesses means that
many voters have been exposed to existing HSR, presumably with favorable results.
• The incremental approach may lead to success in implementing new HSR if both are
pursued concurrently. California has had several successes in incremental rail projects,
persuading at least a portion of the public that rail is a good alternative to the auto
culture. More likely, political leadership is a far more important factor.
• Timing is important. The 1990 California bond issues were voted on in an upbeat
economy. The HSR bonds have been delayed until the economy is more robust, which
legislators believe will improve chances for approval.
• While successive campaigns have played a role in educating Californians about the
respective costs and benefits of various transportation modes, most citizens are
unprepared to assess the value of a project as major as the California Corridor. This lack
of understanding is not unique to California, which suggests that a federal role in public
education about all modes and their costs and benefits would be beneficial.
It is uncertain to what extent a federal political role in California may be appropriate.
Undoubtedly a federal voice would be appropriate commensurate with federal money.

PACIFIC NORTHWEST
When Amtrak assumed passenger rail services from the railroads in May 1971, it continued
limited passenger service—one train—on the Burlington Northern Railway (BN, formerly
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Great Northern Railway) track between Portland, Oregon, and Seattle, Washington. One
additional Amtrak train per day, the Coast Starlight between Seattle and Los Angeles, ran
on the BN between Seattle and Portland, and on the Southern Pacific between Portland and
Eugene, Oregon. There was no rail service between Seattle and Vancouver, B.C., after 1981.
People in the Pacific Northwest often pride themselves on environmental sensitivity and
look for ways to reduce reliance on the environmentally unfriendly automobile. This has led
to attacks on the automobile culture in the public at large and required a change of
philosophy about railroads. Railroads have remained private companies with a negative
image because of the nineteenth-century robber barons.127 Public reluctance to use public
funds to support railroads lingers. In the 1980s, however, sentiment began to grow in
Washington State to develop the obsolete rail passenger service into a modern, high-speed,
high-intensity rail corridor. (Unless otherwise noted, in this section “Washington” refers to
the State of Washington.) The Washington Legislature began funding improvements to
railroad stations, apparently a first step toward the treatment of a rail passenger system as a
state concern, not simply an obligation of Amtrak and the private railroad companies.
Similar efforts were underway in Oregon. Oregon experimented with state-supported,
Amtrak-run Willamette Valley passenger trains between Portland and Eugene in 1980 and
1981. The Willamette Valley is the heart of Oregon, and there are important population
centers between Portland and Eugene in this 124-mile minicorridor.128 However, the state
withdrew funding and the trains were discontinued, officially because of lack of funds.129 In
fact, ridership had been poor because of poor schedule adherence and substandard track
conditions on the Southern Pacific line. It was easier and faster to drive. The Oregon
Legislature established a State Rail Rehabilitation Fund in 1985, but never appropriated
money for it.
The Era of Federally Mandated Studies

In 1991 Congress passed ISTEA, which, among other things, required the U.S. DOT to
identify potential major high-speed transportation corridors. In 1992, the U.S. DOT
identified the Pacific Northwest Rail Corridor (PNWRC) as one of five potential highspeed corridors. This designated corridor extends from Washington State south to Eugene,
Oregon, and north to Vancouver, B.C. The PNWRC extends a total of 466 miles: 134 miles
in Oregon, 297 miles in Washington, and 35 miles in British Columbia (Figure 10). It
appears that political pressure from Washington was significant in this Congressional
action, particularly from Washington Congressman Al Swift. Designation as a corridor
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means the possibility of matching federal grants for construction and operation through the
FRA. It also requires the states in the corridor to complete studies and plans to develop the
corridor at federal expense.

Figure 10 Pacific Northwest Corridor
Washington

Washington efforts preceded ISTEA. In the late 1980s, the legislature requested the
Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) to conduct a “High-Speed
Ground Transportation Study.” Upon enactment of ISTEA, the Washington State
Legislature took the next formal step with a directive to WSDOT to develop a
“comprehensive assessment of the feasibility of developing a high-speed ground
transportation system in the State of Washington”130 (emphasis added). WSDOT responded in
October 1992 with a High-Speed Ground Transportation Study, which confirmed the feasibility
of high-speed rail in Washington. Based on that study, the Washington legislature in April
1993 directed WSDOT to develop “high-quality intercity passenger rail service...through
incremental upgrading of the existing service”131 (emphasis added). WSDOT had used the
term “high-speed”; the Washington legislature did not. The legislature specifically wanted
to build a “rail culture” to “make rail a competitive and viable alternative to automobile and
commuter air travel.”132 Washington defines “high speed” as “up to 125 mph on sections of
the corridor,” after 20 years of development.133 After 20 years, WSDOT plans for the trains
to make the 466-mile trip between Vancouver, B.C., and Eugene, Oregon, in 7 hours,
12 minutes. Seattle to Portland, 186 miles, should take 2-1/2 hours instead of the current
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3 hours, 25 minutes.134 WSDOT estimated that the PNWRC upgrades from Seattle to
Portland will cost $2.7 million per mile, compared with $6.5 million per mile per lane for a
freeway in the corridor area.135
In 1998, the Washington Legislature and Governor Gary Locke created a Blue Ribbon
Commission on Transportation to assess and oversee the entire Washington transportation
system. The commission also assumed responsibility to plan for financial resources to fund
the state’s portion of the 20-year transportation plan.
WSDOT published the Amtrak Plan for Washington State in April 2000. WSDOT always
assumes a cooperative working relationship with the railroad (by that time Burlington
Northern Santa Fe—BNSF). There do not appear to be any WSDOT suggestions to
purchase railroad company rights-of-way, as public Authorities did in the Los Angeles area
and on the San Francisco Peninsula.
Oregon

Inspired by the study incentives contained in ISTEA, Oregon prepared its first
comprehensive assessment, the Oregon Rail Passenger Policy and Plan, in 1992, followed by
the Oregon Rail Freight Plan in 1994. Oregon DOT published the Pacific Northwest Rail
Corridor, Oregon Segment in April 2000, which is supposed to coordinate PNWRC efforts
with Washington’s efforts. Oregon DOT followed up on November 8, 2001, with the 2001
Oregon Rail Plan (2001 ORP), which followed the policies set in the 1992 Rail Passenger
Policy.136 The 2001 ORP is an element of the Oregon Transportation Plan. Once again, the
incentive for the plan was federal: “The Oregon Rail Plan is prepared to fulfill numerous
federal and state planning requirements....The Plan also fulfills the Transportation Equity
Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) requirement that state transportation planning consider,
among other issues...options available to people...of the transportation system.”137
The practical goals of these plans are modest. Oregon originally proposed a $31 million
capital program to improve the track, particularly the Portland-to-Eugene segment that
Union Pacific (UP) had taken over from Southern Pacific. UP agreed to participate in
funding track and signal system improvements.138
Unlike Washington, Oregon’s plans do not specify high-speed. Oregon DOT would be
happy if two or three additional trains could traverse the 124 miles from Portland to Eugene
in 2 hours, 15 minutes, an improvement of only 20 minutes over current scheduled
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performance. In a brief three paragraphs, the 2001 ORP dismisses high-speed rail; that is,
train speeds in excess of 150 mph.139 Oregon is pursuing an incremental approach, as “an
effective plan...that can be implemented in the next six years.” Oregon calculates that real
high-speed rail would cost 12 to 15 times as much as the incremental plan, but would only
attract five times as many riders. This thinking reflects highway planner logic, as if the
comparisons were between two different highway alternatives. The three-paragraph
dismissal of high-speed rail in 2001 ORP makes no effort to place any value on the
consequences that might result if significantly more riders choose to use rail instead of the
highway. Oregon does not compare the cost of rail per mile with the cost of a highway per
mile, as WSDOT does.140
It is telling that Oregon DOT also refers to the I-5 corridor, an expression highway planners
would use, not rail planners.141 Even if Oregon chose an incremental high-speed alternative,
it would only allow passenger trains to operate at 110 to 125 mph.142
British Columbia

During this period, there was limited parallel interest in British Columbia. British
Columbia contributed minimal cooperative funding for Options in 1995 and for the
December 1997 Pacific Northwest Rail Corridor Operating Plan, but nothing further. There is
no Canadian legislation comparable to ISTEA or TEA-21, no rail “corridor” designation
from Ottawa, no mandated studies. The province of British Columbia did not prepare
extensive studies comparable to those prepared in Washington and Oregon, and there are no
plans there to improve the 35 miles of the PNWRC within British Columbia. The impetus
to extend the PNWRC to Vancouver comes from the U.S. side, federal and state.
The Incremental Approach

The Washington legislature specified an incremental approach to what was loosely termed
high-speed rail. Many reasons were given for an incremental approach instead of a new,
dedicated high-speed rail system:
• Better chance to obtain funding over a period of years. Washington has adopted a 20year plan, with financing to be obtained in phases as construction occurs. Funding
would be less probable for a new, and more expensive, dedicated high-speed rail project.
• Logical progression. Using existing rail routes reduces environmental impact problems;
no “greenfield” project can escape massive environmental and NIMBY challenges. This
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reason also presumes that freight railroads will welcome high-speed corridor
development because improved rights-of-way imply more efficient freight movements.
• Market demand-driven development. Further construction phases will depend on the
level of success or failure of service improvements already made. The public can see
various phases of improvement as improvements are made.
• Rail culture development. This is a corollary to the previous item. As service improves
and more people use the system, the population will become more favorably inclined
toward rail systems, will use rail more and rely on automobiles less, and will support rail
funding measures.
• Freight improvement. As rail infrastructure becomes more developed and sophisticated,
freight will move more efficiently, providing a major impetus to the economy. Freight
rail rationalization plans are afoot in Washington, comparable to the recently completed
Alameda Corridor project in the Los Angeles area.143
• Less costly. The incremental approach may only attract 50 percent as many riders as a
new, dedicated high-speed rail system, but the cost of incremental rail is only about
12 percent as much as a new, dedicated, “greenfield” high-speed rail system.144
The population of the Pacific Northwest is smaller than that of California; therefore, the
area is less able to justify an expensive, new, dedicated high-speed rail system.145
What Has Happened
Talgos

Probably the most important development was the WSDOT decision to experiment with
Talgo technology. This Spanish technology features a pendular process that allows rail cars
to tilt on curves. Tilting makes the ride on curved track more comfortable to passengers and
allows faster operation on curves. Talgo trains also are lightweight, have a low center of
gravity, and are articulated, all for a smoother ride on curved track. The trains are largely
manufactured by the Talgo company in Spain, with some final assembly performed in
Washington to comply with local-manufacture requirements. The locomotives are adapted
General Motors F59s, manufactured in Canada. Talgos have been used successfully in
Europe for many years.146 Washington leased two Spanish Talgo trains in 1995 for use on
the PNWRC, and Amtrak operated them under the marketing name “Cascades.” Oregon
began to support the service in 1995 and paid Amtrak to extend one Cascade per day from
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Portland to Eugene. Washington paid to extend one Cascade per day to Vancouver, B.C.
Introduction of the Talgos reduced the operating time from Seattle to Portland by
30 minutes, largely due to higher speed capability on curves.
WSDOT initiated the experiment with Talgo technology in 1993, before WSDOT
published the various studies in response to ISTEA.147 The trains were popular with
passengers, so Washington returned the leased Talgos and bought two new, customized
Talgo trainsets. Amtrak also bought two such trainsets. Talgo built a fifth trainset on spec
and leased it to Oregon in 1999. The trains are modern and comfortable, and Talgo
technology allows faster speeds on curved BNSF track along Puget Sound. Seattle-toPortland ridership in 1993 was 94,000 per year; it grew to 590,000 per year by 2003.148
The increase of ridership on the PNWRC is largely due to the popular introduction of the
Talgos, which have been described as follows:
...based on growth trends, this service is the most successful passenger
operation in North America in the past decade....Credit for the political
commitment, say passenger advocates, mostly goes to Washington state,
which significantly supported the service with cash, guidance, and
staff....Amtrak has put its best into the effort, it’s widely agreed, as has track
owner Burlington Northern Santa Fe, which has operated the Cascades service
as if it were its own.149
Talgos are European design and have some minor discrepancies with FRA train regulations.
The FRA waived the discrepancies but limited operation to a maximum of 79 mph. At
present, this limitation is not important; PNWRC track conditions will not support speeds
in excess of 79 mph. BNSF engineers, worried about increased rail wear on curves, studied
the issue and determined that the Talgos did not materially increase wear on rails. The
Talgos are lightweight, have a low center of gravity, and have tracking wheels, factors that
save wear and tear on track.
The Talgo company decided to sell the Talgo trainset leased to Oregon. WSDOT bought
that fifth trainset in 2003. According to the 2001 ORP, Oregon intended to buy new
trainsets, but could not or simply did not find the money to buy one Talgo to support
existing Cascade service in Oregon.150 Oregon continued to support Cascade service with
the WSDOT and Amtrak Talgos.

Mineta Transportation Institute

High-Speed Rail Case Studies

65

Washington

Efforts by WSDOT, the Blue Ribbon Commission, and nongovernment supporters such as
the Discovery Institute Cascadia Project led to Referendum 51, an effort in 2002 to
persuade Washington voters to approve a 9-cent-per-gallon gas tax to fund various
transportation projects in Washington. Several other tax increases were designated for
PNWRC improvements. Voters in Seattle favored Referendum 51, but it failed 37 percent
to 63 percent statewide.151
Why did Referendum 51 fail? A few quotes from the Cascadia Report are illustrative:
• “Voters are not heeding the advice of business, labor and media leaders...and are
distrustful of government and anyone affiliated with it.” (p. 22)
• “Political power is spread so thinly here that nobody can effectively assert leadership.”
(p. 5)
• “...intergovernmental and special interest infighting....” (p. 30)
• “...the picture is one of electoral negativism, disappointing performance in the biggest
program that was adopted by the voters (Sound Transit) and almost every imaginable
variant of factional disagreement” (p. 1)
• “...usual fault lines of King County/City of Seattle/suburban cities....” (p 31)
Voters outside Seattle were insufficiently sympathetic to traffic congestion in Seattle. There
has long been resentment by the more rural, conservative population east of the Cascade
Mountains against the Seattle area; many of these people perceived Referendum 51 as
another money grab by Seattle. Seattle itself has suffered through a period of tumult (World
Trade Organization riots in 1999, loss of the Boeing Headquarters to Chicago, the telecom
bust) which has challenged the political leadership. It is possible that Referendum 51 was
too complicated and that the political leadership did a poor job explaining how a 9-centper-gallon gas tax would be spent. “The Legislature and the Governor...punted to the voters
on the investment package.”152 The Washington Legislature did not need voter approval to
impose a 9-cent tax, but submitted the issue to the voters anyway.
There also may have been a desire to maintain the status quo. Business, labor, and media
leaders could assert that the Seattle area economy desperately needed transportation
infrastructure improvements, but perhaps many voters preferred to do nothing. Economic
growth might attract more Californians to the Northwest, might cause environmental
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damage, and so on. Voters with such an orientation did not share the perception that a more
sophisticated economy was needed. The failure also calls into question one rationale for
incremental approaches—that it should be easier to obtain funding in incremental steps.
WSDOT had been truncated before Referendum 51. Citizens Initiative 695 in 1999
reduced Washington vehicle registration fees, and the fallout caused a 40 percent budget
cut at the WSDOT Rail Office. As a result, the most important state agency supporting
HSR was weakened at the time of the Referendum 51 debate.
The failure of Referendum 51 fundamentally set back plans for high-speed rail
improvement in Washington and, therefore, in the PNWRC. The Washington political
psyche has not recovered, and the PNWRC has not proceeded as planned.
Subsequently, the Washington legislature pursued a more modest Nickel Plan, a 5-cent gas
tax for transportation projects throughout Washington. About 79 percent of Referendum
51 projects were planned for the Seattle area. The Nickel Plan contained $165 million for
passenger rail improvements, but nothing specifically for high-speed rail. The Nickel Plan
was approved by the Washington legislature and enacted in May 2003. A popular
referendum vote was not needed; no new taxing authority was created.
Washington claims to have invested $400 million in PNWRC projects so far, much of it for
Cascades operational subsidies.153 In 1996, voters in the three counties of the SeattleTacoma area (King, Snohomish, and Pierce) approved creation of Sound Transit. The
purpose was to create and operate Sounder commuter rail service from Seattle north to
Everett and south to Tacoma. Sounder commuter service has begun, with limited service
and over budget. Sound Transit has invested almost $1 billion, some of which was used to
double-track the main line and for signaling.154 Washington pays 50 percent of district
costs. Rail improvements on BNSF track for Sounder trains will benefit the Cascades. For
now, the Cascades are still limited to 79 mph.
In 2000, WSDOT proposed several specific projects to be done in the initial five-year phase
for about $1.9 billion.155 To date, none have been built. Five projects have been targeted by
WSDOT:
• Vancouver, Washington, rail yard bypass. There is a major bottleneck where BNSF freight
trains from the north and south meet and cross UP freight trains from the east and south
and try to cross an old rail bridge across the Columbia River. The bridge is a swing
bridge that must be closed for river traffic. A two-track bypass would substantially
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speed up the Cascades and improve freight movement through Vancouver,
Washington.156 An environmental impact statement is complete, and WSDOT is now
finishing the engineering work. $55 million in state funds may be available for
construction in 2007-2009.
• Kelso to Martin’s Bluff 3rd main line. An environmental impact statement should be ready
in late 2005, with construction scheduled to begin in 2009. The legislature may provide
20 percent of construction funds if the federal government and the railroads pay the
balance. The project will allow through trains, including the Amtrak service, to avoid
local freight traffic associated with the Kalama and Longview ports.
• Point Defiance bypass. All trains follow the circuitous shoreline and single-track tunnels
around the Tacoma Narrows. A 9-mile build-out of neglected track through Tacoma
would shorten and straighten the route. This new alignment would be for passenger
trains only; freight trains would continue to use the current BNSF route.157 Cascades
would save about 11 minutes. An environmental impact study is scheduled for 2005; if
funded, construction would not start until 2009. Reasons for such a lengthy schedule are
not given, but are probably related to funding. The legislature may pay 20 percent of
construction costs over 10 years if the federal government and the railroads pay the
balance.
• Centralia Siding extension.
• Bellingham Siding extension.
WSDOT has spent $23 million for track improvements and sidings north of Seattle. One
siding at Blaine, just south of the Canadian border, is called Swift Siding in honor of Rep.
Al Swift, who helped begin the impetus towards HSR. Additional projects, for the most
part double-tracking, are planned by Sound Transit (which is independent of WSDOT) and
BNSF. Once all these improvements in rail infrastructure are in place, WSDOT expects 13
to 14 daily round trips of 2.5 hours each way between Seattle and Portland. Ridership is
projected to reach 2.2 million passengers per year.158 Passenger service cannot increase until
these bottlenecks are removed. However, the only relevant construction activity south of
Seattle appears to be two rail crossovers under construction in the Tacoma area, which will
allow one additional Cascades round trip between Seattle and Portland by July 2005.
Current plans are reflected in the 2004 Regional Transportation Improvement District
proposal to spend $12.8 billion. There is nothing in that plan for the PNWRC.159
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Oregon

Ridership is up on the Portland-to-Eugene segment of the PNWRC. There were 24,000
passenger trips in 1993, 100,000 in 2000, and the trend continues.160 The reason is the
popularity of the Cascade Talgos, not any major track or signal work in Oregon. Oregon
DOT has spent $4.5 million for rail projects, but that money went for short-line purchase
and for studies.161 Oregon DOT also claims to have spent $127 million in federal funds for
track rehabilitation, but most of that money went to the short lines. It is unclear if, and
how, the $31 million in the original plans for passenger train improvements was allocated
or spent. Oregon states that it would cost $80 million to make track and signal
improvements on the Oregon portion of the PNWRC.162 That money has not been
allocated, and the current Oregon Transportation Plan update includes nothing for longdistance rail or for the PNWRC.163
Oregon has spent a great deal of money to improve rail transportation in Portland, largely
with the construction of Metropolitan Area Express (MAX). MAX, a light-rail system
inaugurated in 1986, centered on a downtown Portland pedestrian transit mall. Three
MAX lines, including one to the airport, now carry 80,000 passengers daily. The Yellow
Line opened May 2004, ahead of schedule and $25 million under budget.164 MAX has no
direct impact on high-speed rail, but it substantially increases the market for public
transportation, which could feed into the PNWRC at Portland. Unlike commuter rail in
California, the success of the MAX system has not translated into more general support for
rail passenger service, perhaps because the remainder of the state has not benefited from
commuter or intercity rail success.
British Columbia

There is no HSR activity in British Columbia. B.C.’s past contribution is limited to
$30,000 for the PNWRC plans. Only one daily Cascade reaches Vancouver, B.C., at
Washington’s expense. A second Cascade runs to Bellingham, Washington, about 20 miles
from the B.C. border. An official in the B.C. Ministry of Transportation stated on the phone
that the B.C. legislature has prepared a five-year review of transportation in the province,
but that plan does not mention high-speed rail nor the PNWRC. He stated that there is no
public interest, there is a reluctance to spend public funds on privately owned railroads, and
the people are highway conscious. A few years ago the province did offer to invest
$20 million (Canadian) in rail infrastructure, but the railroads refused. He did not say what
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the conditions for the funding would have been on the railroads. At any rate, any PNWRC
project in B.C. is “dead as a doornail.”165
Perhaps the reason could be a Canadian preference for a Canadian focus, not on the
PNWRC. (The Pacific Northwest is a U.S., not a Canadian, designation.) Another reason
could be that Oregon, even Washington, prepared studies and plans based on federal U.S.
directives found within ISTEA and TEA-21.166 Perhaps the incentive was found in money
available from federal sources for studies, regardless of whether U.S. federal money would
become available for a high-speed rail system. The Dominion of Canada provided no such
study and plan incentive for British Columbia, which had no desire to commit any
provincial money.
Only 35 miles of PNWRC track is in British Columbia. The BNSF track crosses a bog,
parallels a popular beach at White Rock, and feeds into a congested, 100-year-old Fraser
River bridge at New Westminster. Traffic on the federally owned bridge is controlled by the
Canadian National Railway, not the BNSF. It would cost $1 billion (Canadian) to build a
new bridge. The B.C. Ministry of Transportation considers an upgrade of this route to be
too expensive, although there are reports that Transport Canada, a Canadian federal agency,
is studying Fraser River transportation issues.
Considering that the Winter Olympics will be held in Vancouver in 2010, the lack of
interest in improving rail transportation in British Columbia is surprising. Where will the
people come from, and how will they travel? Will visitors pour through the congested road
crossing at Blaine, Washington? The Pacific Northwest is a major potential market for
Olympic visitors, and a rail connection would seem to have considerable potential for
success. Seattle and Portland are closer to Vancouver, B.C., than any major Canadian city is.
The previously quoted representative of the B.C. Ministry of Transportation stated on the
phone that there are no plans or intentions to improve the 35 miles of BNSF track in B.C. in
preparation for the Olympics.
PNWRC is the only designated active corridor that extends outside the United States and
outside the reach of ISTEA and TEA-21. There is no evidence of any U.S. diplomatic effort
to promote the PNWRC with Canadian officials. Washington State appears to be the only
official U.S. proponent of the Corridor. The results are instructive. Federal legislation
induced states to prepare major studies and plans at federal expense. Washington studies
were backed by genuine rail interest in the state government and by certain private
agencies, but were not backed by a sufficient groundswell of enthusiasm by the Washington
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public. Oregon studies are equally complete but reflect little genuine Oregon DOT
enthusiasm for rail improvement; Oregon studies tend to contain a greater critical mass of
statements that have no associated actions. British Columbia had no financial incentive to
prepare studies and plans, prepared no such plans, and has performed no track or signal
improvement for the Cascades.
Observations

A few preliminary observations may be drawn from the PNWRC experience:
• As in the Florida and California cases, leadership is essential. Although there is
leadership for HSR in Washington State agencies and private organizations, the lack of
strong pro-HSR political leadership in the state has arrested development of the
PNWRC. Political indecision in Washington also means that less motivated partners—
Oregon and British Columbia—will not contribute their share to the partnership.
• At least some of the incentive for various HSR plans and studies was found in the
monies for plans and studies in federal legislation. It is questionable if Oregon would
have produced several of the studies it did without ISTEA and TEA-21 funds. British
Columbia had no such funding available and produced nothing. Did the availability of
funding lead to unwanted studies, or did this exercise in taking advantage of federal
money stimulate a state to increase the priority for HSR? The Oregon example is
questionable at best.
• As in California and Florida, seeing is believing. Whenever politicians or other leaders
visit and ride existing HSR systems, they return enthusiastic. Although a few political
leaders in Washington State had visited HSR systems, those legislators had become
relatively inactive by the time of the critical battle over Referendum 51. This further
reinforces that dependence on elected officials, or perhaps any individual, to lead the
effort will not provide the continuity that a project like HSR requires. Institutions that
can continue regardless of who is in office or in a leadership role are probably a necessity.
• The incremental approach does not guarantee HSR success. Washington State proved
success with the popular Talgos, but that was not sufficient to persuade voters of
Referendum 51.
• Timing is crucial. Washington’s Referendum 51 was not voted on in an upbeat
economy; the political psyche in Washington State has been poor since the World Trade
Organization riots in 1999. Perhaps leadership could have delayed the vote for a sunnier
day.
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• What should the federal role be, other than financing? Limiting the federal role to
funding studies has not resulted in notable success in this corridor. What other federal
actions or support might have made a difference here, or would federal action be
construed as meddling? Probably not, if substantial federal construction funds are
available.
Diplomatic efforts would have been appropriate to coordinate U.S. and Canadian efforts to
promote and develop the PNWRC; that is not a role that a state government can perform.
There is no evidence of any such efforts. A U.S. federal political or diplomatic role with
Canada will be important if the PNWRC is to provide transportation to Vancouver, B.C.,
for the 2010 Winter Olympics. The state of Washington and the province of British
Columbia cannot do it alone.
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KEY FINDINGS, LESSONS, AND THEMES FOR
CONSIDERATION
At the end of each case study in the previous section, observations and assessments related to
the specific cases being examined were provided. In addition, some overall findings stand
out and bear mentioning, as they are likely to be relevant for other HSR efforts in the
United States.

LEADERSHIP BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
First and foremost is the need for stronger leadership at the level of the federal government,
in both vision and funding. With respect to the latter, rail (both passenger and freight rail)
has long been neglected relative to other transportation modes, as the myth that railroads
can pay for themselves is perpetuated.167 Between 1978 and 1999, federal transportation
expenditures on rail totaled $18.3 billion (in constant 2002 dollars), roughly 3.6 percent of
all transportation expenditures. This compares with $251.5 billion (49.9 percent) for
highways; $58.3 billion (11.6 percent) for transit; $114.0 billion (22.6 percent) for air; and
$58.0 billion (11.5 percent) for water transport.168 While all other modes experienced
annual growth in expenditures of between 7.3 and 10 percent, rail actually experienced a
decline during this period of 1.9 percent annually.169 According to Tim Lynch of Florida
State University, this underinvestment in rail has resulted in the “serious erosion of
potential ridership and high-end commodities shipments and resulting losses in user
revenues and tax sources to support the mode.”170
High-speed rail initiatives suffer from lack of public support as well. Florida, for example, is
mired in debates over how the project can be paid for without any public funds. Even when
minimal amounts of public funding are available, responses do occur. In the Pacific
Northwest, for example, it appears that the only reason any studies moved forward is
because the federal government made public monies available. However, providing funds
for studies alone is not enough; funding for implementation is also needed.
There is an overarching need for a national network strategy for rail at the federal level. As
John Bennett, vice president of AECOM Consult, points out, it was leadership at the federal
level that helped build the Interstate Highway System; a similar vision is needed for both
passenger and freight rail in the United States as well as a vision for how rail connects to and
interrelates with all the other modes around the nation.171 Otherwise, the United States will
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continue to miss critical opportunities to make key linkages and enhance efficiency, not just
for high-speed rail, but for regular passenger rail and for freight transport as well.172
Such a strategy must include several facets, including, but not limited to, the following:
• Incorporating passenger (including Amtrak), freight, and high-speed rail in the United
States with a vision of how they are all related
• Envisioning how rail connects to and interrelates with all the other modes around the
nation (and in cases like the Pacific Northwest, with other nations), particularly given
trends to multimodal solutions
• Developing a funding program—tax-based, user-fee-based, or by some other method
• Providing guidance and standards for successful models. Without this last feature, states
will continue to fill the void as they are currently doing, with a multitude of models
ranging from constitutional amendments and legislation, to multistate compacts, to
public-private partnerships, without a sense of what is most likely to succeed.

DEFINING COST
When cost-benefit analyses are developed for high-speed rail, the focus tends to be on the
bottom line—how much money will be put in and how much will be generated. As long as
one looks at cost as bottom-line driven, we are unlikely to see high-speed rail in the United
States, given the capital investment needed to build such systems. Different results are often
obtained when there is a broader tabulation, such as that being developed in California, that
includes other costs of the transportation system (for example, additional cost of highway
maintenance and repair) as well as the public as a whole (for example, increased levels of
pollution as highway use increases) under the no-build option.173
Related to this is the need to be clear on not just the goals of the particular HSR project,
but also on who is really reaping the benefits. If there are truly public benefits, then arguing
for only private funding makes no sense and such projects are unlikely to succeed. If the
public benefits are questionable, then private funding is a better choice.

INSTITUTIONALIZED SUPPORT
In many cases, the spark for building HSR has begun with a particular person in a particular
state. It was Governor Bob Graham in Florida who visited Japan and believed Florida
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should have a similar system. California had similar experiences, with leaders who traveled
abroad and returned to the United States with the goal of building an HSR system similar
to those in Europe and Asia. While the initial vision is important for beginning an effort,
institutionalized support and organizational capability are critical for sustaining the effort
and successfully implementing HSR. Without institutional buy-in for a project as well as
the authority and capability to identify, gather, and manage funding, and the responsibility
for seeing a project through, many HSR projects fail as soon as the key supporter or
visionary leaves (as in Florida) or as economic downturns take place (as in California and the
Pacific Northwest). Equally important, as is seen in Florida and to some degree California,
constitutional amendments or legislative acts alone cannot replace the need for
institutionalized support because the former can be challenged by successive governments
or other stakeholders. Amtrak might be able to play an effective role here, providing some
of the organizational capacity needed, but an integrated vision is needed first.

TECHNOLOGIES AND APPROACHES
Whether to develop a new HSR or an incremental HSR system depends greatly on what one
hopes to accomplish and the context within which one is working. If the goal is to increase
the numbers of commuters using rail instead of automobiles to minimize highway
congestion, the key is to increase frequency and reliability of service, reduce travel times,
and make the system more accessible. Such goals may be better met with an incremental
approach that invests in station and equipment improvements, fixing curves and improving
tracks, and enhancing signals, rather than new HSR. Alternatively, if one is trying to relieve
air congestion between urban areas to free up space for more long-distance flights, a new
HSR system linking key urban areas might be the better approach. Such discussions do not
always occur; often the decision to pursue one approach versus another is based more on
political factors than on a clear assessment and explanation of what the specific goals are and
how best to meet them. Without such discussions, as all three cases demonstrate, whether
incremental or new HSR is being pursued, plans may not progress.

OPPORTUNITIES
Opportunities for both incremental and new HSR exist in the United States and have for
many years, particularly along those corridors federally designated as HSR corridors.
Indeed, a 1997 FRA study on HSGT concluded that HSGT could develop appreciable
ridership.174 The key will be getting at least one project fully implemented in a way that is
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clearly HSR (as opposed to those that run at high speeds only for small distances rather than
at sustained high speeds). Once a project is in revenue service, many of the concerns
expressed by critics, including ridership projections and whether HSR can work in a
country where cars and air transport are dominant, can be addressed by example.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BART

Bay Area Rapid Transit

BN

Burlington Northern

BNSF

Burlington Northern Santa Fe

Caltrain

Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board

Caltrans

California Department of Transportation

CHSRA

California High-Speed Rail Authority

CREATE

Chicago Regional Environmental and Transportation Efficiency Project

DBOM&F

design, build, operate, maintain, and finance

DEIS

Draft Environmental Impact Statement

DOT

Department of Transportation

EIR/EIS

Environmental Impact Report/Environmental Impact Statement

EIS

Environmental Impact Statement

FDOT

Florida Department of Transportation

FEC

Florida East Coast Railway

FEIS

Final Environmental Impact Study

FHSRA

Florida High-Speed Rail Authority

FHSRC

Florida High-Speed Rail Committee
Florida High-Speed Rail Commission

FHWA

Federal Highway Administration

FOX

Florida Overland eXpress

FRA

Federal Railroad Administration

GAO

General Accounting Office

HSGT

high-speed ground transportation

HSR

high-speed rail
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

HST

high-speed train

ICE

Intercity Express

ISTEA

Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991

KPH

kilometers per hour

Maglev

Magnetic Levitation

MAX

Metropolitan Area eXpress

MDOT

Michigan Department of Transportation

MIPRC

Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission

MOA

Memorandum of Agreement

MOS

minimum operable segment

MOU

Memorandum of Understanding

MPH

miles per hour

MTA

Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Los Angeles County)

MWRRI

Midwest Regional Rail Initiative

NACTO

National Association of City Transportation Officials

NIMBY

Not in My Back Yard

ODOT

Ohio Department of Transportation

OIA

Orlando International Airport

OOCEA

Orlando Orange County Expressway Authority

ORDC

Ohio Rail Development Commission

ORP

Oregon Rail Plan

ORTA

Ohio Rail Transportation Authority

PD&E

Project Development and Environmental (process/study), State of Florida

PNWRC

Pacific Northwest Rail Corridor

ROW

right-of-way

RRIF

Railroad Rehabilitation and Infrastructure Funding

SCAG

Southern California Association of Governments
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SCRRA

Southern California Regional Rail Authority

SRRTC

Southern Rapid Rail Transportation Commission

TEA-21

Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century

TGV

Train à Grande Vitesse

THSRA

Texas High-Speed Rail Authority

TIFIA

Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act

TRAC

Train Riders of California

TRB

Transportation Research Board

UP

Union Pacific

U.S. DOT

U.S. Department of Transportation

WSDOT

Washington State Department of Transportation
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